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Applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Single-Member 
Offices 
When Congress amended the Voting Rights Act1 (Act) in 1982, it 
revised section 2,2 the Act's general prohibition against electoral dis-
crimination. Impetus for the changes stemmed, in part, from congres-
sional discontent with the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile 
v. Bolden 3 which required proof of intentional discrimination to estab-
lish a violation of section 2.4 The 1982 amendments to section 2 re-
jected the Court's intent requirement; Congress provided instead that 
demonstrating the discriminatory results of a political process is suffi-
cient to establish a section 2 violation. 5 Yet in reshaping section 2, 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). For a history of the amending process, see Boyd & Markman, 
The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
1347, 1388-412 (1982). For a civil rights advocate's summary of the§ 2 amending process, see 
Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE 
DILU'IlON 151-57 (C. Davidson ed. 1984). But cf. A. 'I'HERNsrROM, WHOSE VOTES CoUNT?: 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 79-137 (1987). 
2. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982)). 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973 (1982) states: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in 
the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class 
of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportu-
nity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been 
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be con-
sidered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 
3. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
4. The Senate Report discussing the amendments to § 2 states: 
S. 1992 amends Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to prohibit any voting practice or 
procedure that results in discrimination. This amendment is designed to make clear that 
proof of discriminatory intents is not required to establish a violation of Section 2. It 
thereby restores the legal standards, based on the controlling Supreme Court precedents, 
which applied prior to the litigation involved in Mobile v. Bolden. 
s. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
177, 179 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also id. at 193. The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that the Senate Report is an "authoritative source" for interpreting amended section 2. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982). "Plaintiffs ••. must show that the challenged system or prac-
tice in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities 
being denied equal access to the political process." SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 205 (em-
phasis added). For an extended discussion of the shift from a Bolden standard to a results test, 
see Parker, The ''Results Test" of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent 
Standard, 69 VA. L. REv. 715 (1983). Essentially, plaintiffs have a choice between proving dis-
criminatory results or intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of 
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Congress did more than simply revise the standard of proof. Congress 
also added sweeping language to section 2, guaranteeing equal oppor-
tunities for minorities6 to participate in the political process (the par-
ticipation prong) and to elect candidates of their choice (the election 
prong).7 
Courts generally have taken a moderate approach when interpret-
ing amended section 2, expanding its scope in some areas8 and restrict-
ing its scope in others.9 The courts have given an especially restrictive 
interpretation to section 2 as it applies to single-member offices. A 
single-member office differs from a multi-member office because 
greater power is concentrated in one individual and no comparable 
office exists in the jurisdiction. Examples of single-member offices in-
clude the mayor of a city and the chairperson of a county commission. 
A multi-member office, in contrast, has counterparts with equivalent 
power in the jurisdiction. A city councilperson or a member of a state 
legislature holds a multi-member office. Two courts of appeals and 
one district court have held or suggested that single-member offices are 
exempt from the coverage of the Act. 10 
Exempting single-member offices from challenge, however, may 
impede section 2's goal of ensuring minorities an equal opportunity to 
elect candidates of their choice and to participate in the political pro-
cess. Because of their distinct power, single-member offices held by 
officials unsympathetic to minorities have a greater potential than 
other offices to diminish minority influence in the political process. At 
the same time, this distinctive power of single-member offices means 
that if these offices are held by minorities, or at least open to their 
participation, these offices may produce greater opportunities for mi-
nority influence than would multi-member offices. Yet, courts may be 
Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1467-69 (M.D. Ala. 1988), a./fd. sub nom. Dillard v. Chilton City 
Commn., 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989); SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 205. 
6. This Note uses the terms blacks, minorities, and minority group interchangeably. Simi-
larly, this Note employs the terms whites, majority, and majority group interchangeably. Black 
citizens are a subset of the racial and language minority groups protected by the Voting Rights 
Act. The Act prevents electoral discrimination based on race, color, or membership in a lan-
guage minority group. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a) and 1973b{f)(2) {1982). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982); see supra note 2 for the text of the statute. 
8. Most notably, courts have held that amended § 2 covers elections for state court judges. 
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 109 
S. Ct. 390 (1988); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. 
Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988). See generally Taylor, Elections far Judges in Tunnoil, Natl. L.J., 
Dec. 18, 1989, at 3, col. 3. 
9. For example, courts have held that a minority group must be able to show it is sufficiently 
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a contested district as a prerequisite 
to a vote dilution claim under § 2. This requirement makes it difficult for a minority group 
which is not geographically compact to establish a § 2 violation even though the group has une· 
qual access to the political process. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986); McNeil v. 
Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 942, 947 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1769 
(1989); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1203-04 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
10. See infra notes 42-84 and accompanying text. 
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reluctant to consider section 2 challenges to single-member offices be-
cause courts do not understand how the combination of election for 
these offices and the conduct of these officeholders after an election 
can violate the goals of section 2. 
This Note questions whether an exemption for single-member of-
fices is justified. Part I provides a brief overview of the Voting Rights 
Act and the types of discrimination in the political process to which it 
applies., Part I then reviews the decisions on single-member offices, 
including the courts' attempts to define single-member offices. This 
Part concludes neither Congress nor the Supreme Court dictates an 
exemption for single member offices. Instead, single-member offices 
should be open to challenge if they hamper the achievement of section 
2's goals. Part II identifies the goals of section 2 by developing a 
number of theories to give meaning to the opportunity to participate 
and elect language of section 2. This Part concludes the goal of sec-
tion 2 is to bolster civic inclusion in the political process by eliminat-
ing the lingering effects of race discrimination. Part III then tests the 
exemption for single-member offices against the goal of section 2. This 
Note concludes that the exemption actually thwarts section 2's goal 
and, therefore, single-member offices should be open to challenge 
under section 2. Finally, Part IV develops guidelines for applying sec-
tion 2 to single-member offices. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE 
DECISIONS REGARDING SINGLE-MEMBER OFFICES 
This Part begins with an overview of the Voting Rights Act, in-
cluding the three forms of electoral discrimination frequently chal-
lenged under section 2 of the Act. Section I.A argues that the three 
forms of electoral discrimination adequately describe some, but not 
all, violations of section 2 by single-member offices. Section I.B re-
views decisions on single-member offices, concentrating on the reason-
ing used by courts to exempt these offices from section 2 challenges. 
Section I.C questions the exemption for single-member offices by es-
tablishing that neither Congress nor the Court mandated an exemp-
tion for these offices. 
A. The Coverage of the Voting Rights Act 
In response to the considerable voting obstacles faced by blacks, 11 
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.12 The Act contains 
three key sections aimed at preventing electoral discriminatibn. Sec-
tion 2 establishes the basic definition of a violation of the Act. 13 This 
11. For a description of these obstacles, see A. THERNsrROM, supra note 1, at 1-2; see also 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 182. 
12. 42 u.s.c. § 1973 (1982). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982). See supra note 2 for the text of the statute. 
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section applies nationwide to prohibit electoral discrimination. t4 For 
example, section 2 prohibits election practices that discourage minor-
ity citizens from voting or running for office. ts Section 2 also attacks 
election devices, such as at-large elections, that dilute the influence of 
minority voters. t6 Section 4 of the Act suspends the use of "tests or 
devices" designed to prevent minorities from registering and voting in 
jurisdictions specified by a trigger formula.t7 In addition, the Attor-
ney General is authorized to send in federal examiners to register vot-
ers or monitor the conduct of elections in covered jurisdictions.ts 
Section 5 requires jurisdictions identified by the trigger formula, and 
therefore covered by seetion 4, to precleart9 any changes in voting or 
election laws with federal authorities. 20 
Section 4 epitomizes the Act's initial focus on individuals' access to 
the ballot.21 The original Act, however, also recognized and protected 
group participation in the political process. 22 After the Act passed, 
group participation began to receive attention both from officials in 
jurisdictions covered by section 4 and from Congress. Officials, while 
allowing some individual blacks to register and vote, shifted their at-
tention to devices designed to diminish the influence of black voters as 
a group.23 These practices are commonly known as vote dilution.24 
14. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 192 ("Section 2 - the Act's general prohibition 
against voting discrimination -·applies to every state and county."). 
15. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra section III.B.1. 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982). For example, if in the 1964 presidential elections a jurisdiction 
required a literacy test or similar device and if less than half of its electorate registered or voted, 
then the jurisdiction was covered under § 4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982). 
18. 42 u.s.c. § 1973d-f (1982). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). All covered jurisdictions must submit any "standard, practice 
or procedure with respect to voting" to the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department for 
advance approval. The Division then has 60 days to determine whether the proposed standard, 
practice, or procedure has a discriminatory purpose or effect. If so, the Division can prevent the 
jurisdiction from implementing the change. 
20. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 182. For extended discussions of§ 5, see Days & 
Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra 
note 1, at 167; Slawsky, A Local Government's Guide to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 12 
URB. LAW. 700 (1972); MacCoon, The Enforcement of the Preclearance Requirement of Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 107 (1979); Comment, Vote Dilution, 
Discriminatory Results, and Proportional Representation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a 
Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1203, 1209-21. For a discus-
sion of the interplay between §§ 2 and 5 of the Act, see McKenzie & Krauss, Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act: An Analysis of the 1982 Amendment, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 168-
71 (1984); see also Jones, Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act: A Limited but Important 
Impact, 73 NATL. Clvlc REv. 176 (1984). 
21. See generally A. THERNSTROM, supra note 1 (arguing that the Voting Rights Act was 
only concerned with individual access to the ballot). 
22. See Karlan & McCrary, Without Fear and Without Research: Abigail Themstrom on the 
Voting Rights Act (Book Review), 4 J.L. & PoL. 751, 756-57 (1988). 
23. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 183 ("Following the dramatic rise in registration, a 
broad array of dilution schemes were employed to cancel the impact of the new black vote."). 
24. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 398 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) ("The right to vote can 
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Congress reacted by renewing and expanding the coverage of the Act 
in 197025 and 1975.2 6 In this way, Congress concentrated on the qual-
ity of a group's enfranchisement, rather than an individual's mere ac-
cess to the ballot. 
After the Supreme Court decided City of Mobile v. Bolden 27 in 
1980, many observers argued that the decision thwarted Congress' de-
sire to expand minority participation in the political process. 28 In 
Bolden, the Court held that section 2 of the Act required proof of 
intentional discrimination. 29 Congress responded to this decision in 
1982. Along with renewing sections of the Act due to expire,3° Con-
gress also amended section 2 to establish that proof of discriminatory 
results is adequate to establish a violation of section 2.31 Congress 
framed section 2's results test in the language of equal opportunity.32 
Thus, section 2 has become the primary vehicle for combating dis-
crimination in the political process. 
Typically, plaintiffs challenge three types of electoral discrimina-
tion under section 2. 33 The first type, disenfranchisement, prevents or 
discourages citizens from voting. Disenfranchisement may be accom-
be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a 
ballot."). For more information on vote dilution, see infra notes 37, 102-16 and accompanying 
text. 
25. Congress renewed the Act in 1970 to attack "obstructionist tactics" employed by South-
ern jurisdictions to exclude blacks from the political process. See Joint Views of Ten Members of 
the Judiciary Committee Relating to the Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess., reprinted in 116 CoNG. REc. 5517, 5520-21, 5529 (Mar. 2, 1970). · 
26. In 1975, congressional hearings demonstrated that covered jurisdictions continued to di-
lute the votes of minority groups. Congress renewed the Act to counter these practices. Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Voting Rights Act Extension, S. Rep. No. 295, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1975). In addition, Congress expanded the coverage of the Act to protect 
language minority citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(l) (1982) (congressional findings of voting 
discrimination against language minorities). See generally UNITED STATES CoMMISSION ON 
ClvIL RlGHTS, THE VOTING RlGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 76-88 (1981) [hereinafter 
U.S. CoMMISSION]. 
27. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
28. See, e.g., Derfuer, Nondiscrimination in Districting, in REPRESENTATION AND REDIS-
TRICTING lssUES 65, 65-66 (B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, R. McKay & H. Scarrow eds. 1982) (argu-
ing that Bo/den's intent standard made successful § 2 challenges "well-nigh impossible"); Miller 
& Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act· What Is the Intent of the Results Test?, 
36 EMORY L.J. 1, 9 n.35 (1987) (outlining evidence from Extension of the Voting Rights Act: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 
97 Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 203 ("[A]fter Bolden 
litigators virtually stopped filing new vote dilution cases. Moreover, the decision had a direct 
impact on voting dilution cases that were making their way through the federal judicial 
system."). 
29. 446 U.S. at 66-68. 
30. Congress renewed the coverage of the special provisions of the Act, §§ 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
42 u.s.c. § 1973 (1982). 
31. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
32. 42 u.s.c. § 1973(b) (1982). 
33. See Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, 
supra note 1, at 3-5. 
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plished either directly, by prohibiting minorities from voting, or "indi-
rectly by rules and practices that on their face are not discriminatory 
but in fact discourage a group of potential voters from casting a bal-
lot. "34 Examples of disenfranchisement include purges of registration 
rolls, establishment of difficult registration and voting procedures, and 
the threat of reprisals against minority voters. 35 
A second form of electoral discrimination, candidate diminution, 
occurs when candidates representing the interests of a group of voters 
are prevented or discouraged from running. Examples of candidate 
diminution include changing government posts from elective to ap-
pointive when a minority candidate has a chance of winning, setting 
high filing and bonding fees, and increasing the number of signatures 
required on qualifying petitions. 36 
Vote dilution is the third form of electoral discrimination often 
challenged under section 2. Vote dilution is "a process whereby elec-
tion laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with sys-
tematic bloc voting" by a white majority voting group "to diminish 
the voting strength" of a minority group. 37 
34. Id. at 3. 
35. See, e.g., U.S. CoMMISSION, supra note 26, at 22-24 (harassment and intimidation in 
registration); id. at 27-28 (purging and reregistration); id. at 29-31 (inconvenient polling places); 
id. at 34-35 (harassment and intimidation in voting); see also Voting Rights Act, Runoff Primaries 
and Registration Barriers: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Commission on the Judiciary, Rep. No. 119, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 120-
24, 209 (1983) [hereinafter Registration Barriers]; Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. 
Ala. 1988) (election procedures discriminated against minority groups); Mississippi State Chap-
ter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (cumbersome registration 
procedures violated§ 2); Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982) (proposed location of 
polling place would be substantial deterrent to voting by blacks); Comment, The Purging of 
Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws and the Voting Rights Act, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483 
(1988). 
36. See, e.g., U.S. CoMMISSION, supra note 26, at 59-61 (detailing impediments to minority 
candidates and their supporters); SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 183 (noting that elective 
posts were made appointive to prevent minority candidates from gaining office); Velasquez v. 
City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1984) (minority candidate for city council testified 
that he and his family suffered "continuous threats and abuses" during and after his candidacy); 
L. McDONALD, VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTII: TEN YEARS OF LmGATION CHALLENGING 
CoNTINUING DISCRIMINATION AGAINsr MINORITIES 111-12 (1982) (a special report from the 
American Civil Liberties Union that discusses high filing and bonding fees). 
37. Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra 
note 1, at 4. Davidson identifies a number of distinctive characteristics about vote dilution. 
First, the process of vote dilution is more subtle than the other forms of discrimination. Nothing 
in the wording of "dilutionary laws" suggests they are discriminatory and the laws may not 
produce discriminatory results in every case. Id. Second, dilution is a group phenomenon. "It 
occurs because the propensity of an identifiable group to vote as a bloc waters down the voting 
strength of another identifiable group, under certain conditions." Id. Finally, the diminished 
power caused by vote dilution does not result from the behavior of the group whose votes are 
. diluted. Instead, electoral practices that operate in a discriminatory fashion when combined with 
bloc voting by the majority cause vote dilution. Id. at 5. 
A number of electoral structures and practices can cause vote dilution. At-large elections are 
probably the most common form of dilutionary device. See infra notes 173-97 and accompany-
ing text. Run-olfrequirements may also cause vote dilution. See infra notes 169-70 and accom-
panying text. Other examples of election practices that may result in vote dilution include anti-
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The three traditionally recognized forms of electoral discrimina-
tion indicate how a single-member office can violate the Act in ways 
similar to multi-member offices. For example, a discriminatory slating 
process can dilute minority voting strength whether the office being 
slated is a mayor (a single-member office) or city councilperson (a 
multi-member office).38 Likewise, if an official refuses to distribute re-
gistration information to a minority candidate running for either a sin-
gle- or niulti-member office, candidate diminution occurs regardless of 
whether the official holds a single- or multi-member post. 39 The three 
traditional types of electoral discrimination, however, fail to account 
adequately for unique violations of the Act caused by single-member 
officeholders. For instance, a chairperson of a county commission, 
elected at-large, may employ his enhanced power to diminish the influ-
ence of associate commissioners chosen by the minority community. 
Here, the minority citizens may be having their votes diluted by the at-
large elections for the chairperson.40 "Vote dilution" describes this 
effect, but it fails to account for how the concentrated political power 
of the chairperson's office enables him to dilute the influence of the 
minority groups' elected representatives. The chairperson's actions 
produce a hybrid violation of section 2: both "vote dilution" as the at-
large elections place the chairperson beyond reach of minority voters 
and an impermissible "concentration of power" in the chairperson 
that diminishes a minority group's opportunity to participate in the 
political process. 
single shot devices, decreasing the size of a government body, exclusive slating groups, and gerry-
mandering. Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, 
supra note 1, at 6-9. 
38. Discriminatory slating is cognizable under§ 2. See Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1984); Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 718 F. Supp. 1324, 1325-27 (N.D. 
ill. 1989); Collins v. City of Norfolk, 679 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Va. 1988), revd., 883 F.2d 1232 (4th 
Cir. 1989),petitionforcertfiled, 58 U.S.L.W. 3430 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1989) (No. 89-989). A slating 
process can be used to diminish minority participation in the political process in two ways. First, 
a slating organization could exclude minorities from any participation in the selection of candi-
dates and select no minority candidates. This is similar to the procedure employed in the 
"Jaybird primaries." Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Second, a slating group could ex-
clude minorities from participation in the slating process, yet choose a "minority" candidate. 
This candidate, however, often does not represent the interest of the minority community, rather 
the candidate is weak and owes his allegiance to the slating group. This is particularly insidious 
because it creates the illusion that the minority group is participating in the political process. See 
e.g., Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert granted sub 
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975), ajfd., 424 U.S. 636 
(1976): 
[W]e cannot endorse the view that the success of black candidates at the polls necessarily 
forecloses the possibility of dilution of the black vote. . • . [S]uch success might be attributa-
ble to political support motivated by different considerations - namely that election of a 
black candidate will thwart successful challenges to electoral schemes on dilution grounds. 
485 F.2d at 1307. 
39. See, e.g., Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1984) (hostility towards 
minority candidates for justice of the peace and county clerk relevant to the § 2 inquiry). 
40. See infra section 111.B.1 for a detailed description of how at-large elections can dilute 
minority voting strength. 
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Courts may not recognize this hybrid violation of section 2 because 
they have held that single-member offices cannot dilute minority vot-
ing strength.41 But focusing narrowly on vote dilution may blind 
courts to the threat posed by the concentrated power of single-member 
offices. If a minority group can elect representatives, but these repre-
sentatives have their influence diminished by single-member offices im-
munized from section 2's scrutiny, the right to an equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process becomes an empty right. The next 
section will review the response of courts to section 2 challenges of 
single-member offices. 
B. Reviewing the Decisions on Single-Member Offices 
Four courts have considered section 2 challenges to election meth-
ods for single-member offices or the structure of these offices. City of 
Ca"ollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings42 involved single-member 
office issues, even though the Eleventh Circuit did not formally recog-
nize the concept.43 Two other cases, Butts v. City of New York44 and 
Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 45 recognize the concept of single-member 
offices without formally defining the term. A fourth case, Christian 
Leadership Conference v. Siege/man, 46 attempted to synthesize Butts 
and Dillard into a more formal definition of single-member office. Ac-
cording to the courts in Butts, Dillard, and Siege/man, if an office qual-
ifies as single-member, it is excluded from the coverage of section 2. 
With such a drastic result dependent on whether an office is denomi-
nated single-member, an understanding of the courts' use of the term 
is important. Consequently, this section reviews the cases presenting 
single-member office issues and the courts' understanding of the 
concept. 
1. City ofCa"ollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings 
Although the Eleventh Circuit in Stallings did not specifically rec-
ognize the single-member office concept, the case is nevertheless signif-
icant because the court considered expanding a single-member post 
into a multi-member body. Carroll County, located in the west-cen-
tral part of Georgia, was governed by a single county commissioner.47 
41. See infra notes 53-79 and accompanying text. 
42. 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton 
Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988). 
43. The Eleventh Circuit did not address the single-member issue. The defendants, however, 
raised the issue as the principal reason for the Court to grant their petition for a writ of certiorari. 
Brief for Petitioners at 16-20, Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 
(1988) (No. 87-1186) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
44. 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 
45. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987). 
46. 714 F. Supp. 511, 518-20 (M.D. Ala. 1989). 
47. The court found: 
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In 1980, blacks comprised 17 percent of the total population of Carroll 
County and 15.3 percent of the voting age population. The NAACP 
alleged that the one-person form of government in Carroll County di-
luted black voting strength. In fact, "[n]o black person has run suc-
cessfully for the office of commissioner throughout the history of 
Carroll County."48 Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that the 
single-member commission was adopted for the discriminatory pur-
pose of limiting black voter strength.49 · 
The Eleventh Circuit highlighted the difficulties the at-large elec-
tion for a single commissioner presented for minority voters. 50 In Car-
roll County, black citizens had no opportunity to elect representatives 
of their choice because their voting strength was submerged by the 
white majority. The existence of racially polarized voting, combined 
with at-large elections for the single commissioner, decreased blacks' 
opportunities to engage in the political process.51 
To cure the discrimination in the Carroll County political process, 
the Eleventh Circuit ordered the district court to consider expanding 
the county's single-member commission to a three- or five-person com-
mission chosen by district. 52 Ordering consideration of an expanded 
commission is significant because it shows the willingness of a court to 
consider alternatives to single-member offices. In effect, the court rec-
ognizes that single-member offices should not be immunized from 
challenge. 
2. Butts - The ''Share of" Representation Concept 
In Butts v. City of New York, 53 the Second Circuit became the first 
court to exempt single-member offices from section 2's coverage. In 
Butts, plaintiffs challenged a New York statute requiring that if no 
candidate for the office of mayor, city council president, or comptrol-
ler of the City of New York received 40 percent or more of the votes 
cast in a party's general primary, then the Board of Elections must 
The Carroll County Commissioner is the entire governing body for the county. The com-
missioner is vested with the powers, among other things: to direct, control and convey the 
county property; to abolish wards, to establish election precincts and militia districts accord-
ing to law, to select and appoint all minor offices of the county, whose election or appoint-
ment is not otherwise fixed by law. 
829 F.2d 1547, 1551 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton 
Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988). 
48. 829 F.2d at 1551. 
49. 829 F.2d at 1551-52. 
50. By focusing on the at-large character of the single-member commission, the Eleventh 
Circuit was able to draw heavily on the Supreme Court's analysis in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30 (1986). The Eleventh Circuit considered the single county commissioner "to be in all 
essential respects comparable with the multi-member district discussed by the court in Gingles." 
829 F.2d at 1549. For more on Gingles, see infra notes 102-16 and accompanying text. 
51. 829 F.2d at 1559. 
52. 829 F.2d at 1563. 
53. 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 
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conduct a runoff between the two top vote-getters in the general pri-
mary. s4 Minority group voters argued that this runoff requirement 
diluted their voting strength in violation of section 2. The Second Cir-
cuit rejected this challenge, due, in large part, to the court's belief that 
section 2 did not apply to the offices challenged because they were 
single-member posts. 
The court, without expressly defining single-member offices, out-
lined some characteristics of these offices by contrasting them with 
multi-member government bodies. In the court's view: 
There can be no equal opportunity for representation within an office 
filled by one person. Whereas, in an election to a multi-member body, a 
minority class has an opportunity to secure a share of representation 
equal to that of other classes by electing its members from districts in 
which it is dominant, there is no such thing as a ''share" of a single-
member office. ss 
The court found this distinction implicit in the Supreme Court's City 
of Port Arthur v. United States s6 decision. In Port Arthur, the Court 
struck down a runoff requirement appended to the city's at-large vot-
ing system for seats on the multi-member city council, but made no 
mention of a similar runoff requirement for the election of mayor. 
3. Dillard - Blending Butts' "Share of" Approach with a 
Functional Approach 
The significance of the Dillard v. Crenshaw County s1 decision lies 
in the Eleventh Circuit's creative solution to the voting rights concerns 
raised by a single-member office. In Dillard, black voters challenged 
Calhoun County, Alabama's commission form of government. Blacks 
comprised 17.6 percent of the county's population, and 15.9 percent of 
the voting population. Blacks in the county were "on average educa-
tionally and economically less advanced than whites."S8 In addition, 
the black community was politically cohesive and geographically insu-
lar. The citizens of Calhoun County had never elected a black county 
54. 779 F.2d at 143. 
55. 779 F.2d at 148 (emphasis added). Similarly, the court stated: "We cannot, however, 
take the concept of a class's impaired opportunity for equal representation and uncritically trans-
fer it from the context of elections for multi-member bodies to that of elections for single-member 
offices." 779 F.2d at 148. 
Although the court never explicitly gives examples of single-member offices, one can assume 
that the court considered New York City's mayor, 'city council president, and comptroller to be 
single-member offices because the challenged primary law applied to them. 
The Second Circuit's sweeping language suggests that it exempted all single-member offices 
from section 2 challenge. However, the actual holding may be narrower. The court stated: "It 
suffices to rule in this case that a run-off election requirement in such an election does not deny 
any class an opportunity for equal representation and therefore cannot violate the Act." 779 
F.2d at 149. 
56. 459 U.S. 159 (1982). 
57. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987). 
58. 831 F.2d at 247. 
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commiss1oner. The lack of black representatives stemmed, in part, 
from the racially polarized voting in the county.59 
The parties in Dillard agreed that Calhoun County's at-large elec-
tions for two associate commissioners and one county commission 
chairperson violated section 2 by diluting minority voting strength. 60 
The district court invited the parties to respond with acceptable alter-
natives. Calhoun County proposed expanding the commission to five 
associate commissioners chosen by district and one chairperson 
elected at-large. 61 Plaintiffs accepted the five-member proposal, but 
argued that the at-large chairperson position would continue to dilute 
minority voting strength. Hence, the only issue on appeal was 
whether retaining an at-large chairperson would deprive the plaintiffs 
of an adequate remedy for the admitted section 2 violation. 62 Calhoun 
County tried to insulate the chairperson from a section 2 challenge by 
invoking the Butts exemption for single-member offices. 63 The county 
emphasized that the chairperson would serve primarily as an adminis-
trator with limited legislative duties within the commission. 
The court, while recognizing the single-member office exception, 
held that it did not apply in this case. The court acknowledged that 
for some offices, such as sheriffs, probate judges, and tax collectors, 
"at-large, non-proportional elections are inherent to their nature as 
single-person officers elected by direct vote. Such single offices are 
most commonly limited to non-legislative functionaries."64 
The court denied the proposed Calhoun County chairperson sin-
gle-member status because "the overlap between the roles of the com-
mission and the chairperson do not allow us to consider this office as a 
separate, single-office position."65 Ultimately, the court believed the 
other commission members "would have their voting strength and in-
fluence diluted" by the chairperson. 66 As a result, Calhoun County's 
59. 831 F.2d at 247. 
60. 831 F.2d at 248. 
61. 831 F.2d at 248. 
62. 831 F.2d at 248. 
63. 831 F.2d at 251. 
64. 831 F.2d at 251 (citation omitted). 
65. 831 F.2d at 251. Similarly, the court stated: "[W]e are not satisfied that the chairperson 
will be sufficiently uninfluential in the activities initiated and in the decisions made by the com-
mission proper to be evaluated as a single-member office." 831 F.2d at 253. The court also noted 
that "[t]he history that brought this case to this Court is a commission which over time skewed 
power heavily into the hands of the chairperson." 831 F.2d at 252. 
66. 831 F.2d at 253 (quoting Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 296 (M.D. Ala. 
1986)). The court stated that under the new plan, the power of the chairperson "'stays where it 
has always been.'" 831 F.2d at 252 n.13. These powers included broad discretion in appoint-
ments for carrying out the prescribed work of the county, including services and construction 
projects; resolving citizens' complaints about county services; representing the county on various 
local and state boards; lobbying the county's interests to the legislature; overseeing county con-
struction projects; liaising with military installations in the county; and assuring the execution of 
commission policies by other county officers. 831 F.2d at 251. 
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proposal would not completely remedy the section 2 violation. In 
place of the at-large chairperson, the court proposed a number of al-
ternatives: a rotating chairperson, a hired executive, or "perhaps a 
clearly delimited job description along with other safeguards" to pre-
vent the chairperson from infringing on the work of the associate com-
missioners. 67 Any alternative had to preserve fully the integrity of the 
elected associate commissioners. On remand, the parties chose, and 
the district court approved, a rotating chairperson. 68 
4. Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siege/man 
In Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siege/man, 69 an 
Alabama federal district court drew on both Butts and Dillard in its 
attempt to characterize the essence of a single-member office. The 
plaintiffs in Siege/man challenged the State of Alabama's use of num-
bered place, at-large elections for state circuit and district judges, ar-
guing that these elections violated section 2 by diluting black voting 
strength. The defendants countered that "section 2 does not apply to 
the Alabama judiciary because state circuit and district judges hold 
'single-member offices.' "70 The court, in rejecting the defendant's ar-
gument, defined single-member offices and demonstrated why the 
judges in this case did not fit the definition. 
The court, relying on Butts and Dillard, stated that the "true hall-
mark of a single-member office is that only one position is being filled 
for an entire geographic area, and the jurisdiction can therefore be 
divided no smaller."71 Here, the court imposed a limit on the cover-
age of the Act without explicitly announcing it.· The court assumed if 
it could not imagine an office being filled by more than one person, 
then it must be single-member. For example, the court cannot imag-
ine more than one person holding the office of mayor or city council 
president. 12 
The court rejected the'defendants' asserted alternative definition of 
a single-member office as one in which "the full authority of that office 
67. 831 F.2d at 253. 
68. 679 F. Supp. 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1988). 
69. 714 F. Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala. 1989). 
70. 714 F. Supp. at 518. 
71. 714 F. Supp. at 518 n.19. The court also stated that a single-member office refers to a 
situation where under no circumstances will there ever be more than one such position in a 
particular jurisdiction. The court noted it is possible to have more than one district or circuit 
judge in a particular jurisdiction and, thus, judges could not be single-member offices under its 
definition. 
72. As will be discussed infra, this is an incorrect assumption. While technically only one 
person at a time can serve as mayor or council president, different people can serve during any 
given term. As the Dillard court suggested, an office can be rotated among commission mem-
bers. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987). Or additional offices can 
be created, such as a vice-mayor. 
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is exercised exclusively by one individual. " 73 The court noted that in 
most cases "any officeholder who wields his authority independently 
will coincidentally also be the only holder of his position in the entire 
geographic area."74 These two characteristics do not always co-ex-
ist, 75 however, and when they do, they do so only by coincidence. 
In addition, the court rejected the defendants' definition because it 
did not comport with the court's view of the relationship between sin-
gle-member offices and the theoretical justification for section 2. In 
the case of a single-member office: 
the at-large boundaries coincide with the only "district" boundaries pos-
sible; because there is only one position to be filled, it becomes impossible 
to split up the jurisdiction any smaller. The concept of vote dilution is 
effectively rendered meaningless and such offices are inappropriate for 
section 2 vote dilution challenges. 76 
In contrast, there is no such rationale for not applying section 2 to 
elected positions merely because "the full authority of that office is 
exercised exclusively by one individual," as the defendants suggested. 
Thus the court reasoned that the judicial offices challenged in this case 
were not single-member. 
5. Synthesizing the Concepts of Single-Member Offices Offered in 
Butts, Dillard, and Siegelman 
The Siegelman and Butts cases reflect one of the two approaches 
courts have taken to single-member offices. The approach in these 
cases may be termed the "share of" approach. 77 This approach relies 
on the apparent truism that "there cannot be vote dilution where 'dis-
tricts in which [the minority] is dominant' are physically impossible to 
create."78 For example, if blacks comprise 40 percent of a city, their 
vote for a mayor's office, according to the "share of" approach, cannot 
be diluted because only one district (the entire city) is at stake and this 
73. 714 F. Supp. at 518 (quoting the defendants). 
74. 714 F. Supp. at 518. 
75. For example, in Butts, one of the three positions at issue - city council president - was 
not, according to the court, an office whose full authority was exercised by one individual. In-
stead, the council president exercised his authority as a co-equal member of the Board of Esti-
mates, a multi-member body. 714 F. Supp. 520 n.26. 
76. 714 F. Supp. at 519-20 (footnote omitted). "In other words, where there is only one 
position at stake, it is impossible that a minority's voting power has been diluted by the imple-
mentation of at-large elections, just as it is impossible to split up the area into districts in order to 
enhance a minority's voting power." 714 F. Supp. at 519. 
77. This approach taken in Siegelman and Butts could also be termed the "Can you imag-
ine?" approach because the court, in effect, is saying, "Can you imagine more than one office of 
this kind within a jurisdiction?" Since the court, for example, cannot imagine a town with even 
the functional equivalent of more than one mayor, a mayor is deemed a single-member office. 
But because the court can imagine more than one judge in a jurisdiction, a judge is not a single-
member office. 
78. 714 F. Supp. at 519 (emphasis in orginal) (quoting Butts v. City of New York, 779 F. 
Supp. 141, 148 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986)). 
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district cannot be subdivided to give minority voters a "share of" the 
mayor's office. 
The second approach, demonstrated in Dillard, recognizes the 
"share of" concept, but casts its definition more in functional terms, 
and thus can be called the "functional approach." The functional ap-
proach suggests that executive or administrative offices, because of the 
functions they perform, tend to be single-member offices and therefore 
beyond challenge. The Dillard court employs function as a marker of 
single-member offices in conjunction with the "share of" approach. 
Thus, an office would qualify as single-member both because of its 
function and because a minority group could not receive a propor-
tional "share of" the single office. 79 
According to both the "share of" and "functional" approaches, 
three features typically characterize single-member offices. First, to be 
considered a single-member office there is traditionally only one such 
position in a jurisdiction. 8° For example, a county commission tradi-
tionally has only one chairperson and a town has only one mayor.81 
Second, the power exercised by the single-member office must be 
greater than that exercised by multi-member offices. Although this 
may be a coincidence of having only one person holding the office, as 
the Siege/man court suggests, 82 this coincidence is important since the 
concentration of power in a single-member office provides an opportu-
nity to thwart the goals of section 2. 83 
79. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 251 (11th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that a sin-
gle-member office is not subject to proportional representation issues). 
80. Of course, tradition can be difficult to judge. Consider the Stollings case, supra notes 47-
52. In Stollings, a single county commissioner, invested with all of the county's legislative and 
executive power, governed the county. The county, however, had not always been governed by a 
single commissioner. At other times, three- and five-member commissions governed the county. 
City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988). It 
would be difficult to say whether traditionally there was only one such position in this jurisdic-
tion. This demonstrates the limited value of looking to tradition. 
81. "Traditionally" is used because a chairperson could be rotated among commission mem-
bers, as in Dillard. While only one member at a time holds the chair position, many members 
may hold the position during a legislative term. Alternatively, two persons may share the office 
of mayor. 
82. Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 518 (M.D. Ala. 
1989). 
83. Power may be concentrated in two ways that raise concern. First, consider the powers 
exercised by the single county commissioner in Stallings. In that case the concentration of all the 
county's legislative and executive power in one office places the office hopelessly beyond reach of 
minority voters. Admittedly, this de jure total concentration of power is rare. In Georgia, only 
24 of 159 counties have a single-member commission. See Respondents' Petition in Opposition 
to Writ of Certiorari at 13, Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 
(1988) (No. 87-1186). But the de facto equivalent could occur. That is, all the government 
power in a jurisdiction could effectively gravitate to a single-member office, like a mayor. 
The second, and more typical, concentration of power occurs when a single-member office 
holder debases the influence of other members of the government organization. The Dillard case 
is illustrative. In Dillard, far less concern would have arisen if the chairperson were a mere 
figurehead instead of an officer with powers greater than those of the other members of the 
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Finally, an important indicator of a single-member office may be 
that the position is elected at-large. The Siegelman court appears to 
have this in mind when it mentions at-large boundaries coinciding 
with the only district lines possible. 84 
C. Establishing that Neither Congress nor the Court Mandated an 
Exemption for Single-Member Offices 
With this understanding of the challenges to single-member offices, 
one can begin to question the opinions exempting these offices from 
challenge. The first step in this process is to analyze the authority 
these decisions draw on to support an exemption for single-member 
offices. As this section will demonstrate, neither Congress nor the 
Supreme Court mandates an exemption for single-member offices. 
Rather, applying section 2 to these offices actually furthers the goals of 
the Act as it has been interpreted both by Congress and the Court. 
Congress never made a distinction between single-member offices 
and all other offices. None of the cases recognizing the single-member 
issue cite any legislative history to support an exemption for single-
member offices. Moreover, Congress did not recognize a distinction 
among types of offices based on the function an office serves. 85 This 
suggests that Congress did not intend that a functional distinction be-
tween single-member offices and all others would exempt single-mem-
ber offices from the Act's coverage. 86 
Yet, a critic of applying the Act to single-member offices may ar-
gue that because Congress did not specifically mention single-member 
offices, it did not intend for the Act to apply to them. Congress' intent 
to combat racial discrimination in voting, however, requires courts to 
give section 2 a broad construction. The Fifth Circuit in Chisom v. 
commission. Similarly, a mayor has power concentrated in his office distinct from all other posi-
tions in the government, and he has an opportunity to depreciate the influence of other members 
of the government. 
84. While the at-large character may increase voting rights concerns, election at large should 
not be essential for single-member status. Consider the office of a city council president elected, 
not at large by the citizens, but rather by the individual council members. This office could 
diminish the opportunity of a minority group to participate in the political process. Imagine that 
there were ten council members in a city comprised of 70 percent white voters and 30 percent 
black voters. And suppose white voters controlled seven districts and black voters three. The 
seven council members allied with the white interests would be able to elect the city council 
president without need of bargaining with the black representatives. 
85. As the Dillard court notes: "Nowhere in the language of Section 2 nor in the legislative 
history does Congress condition applicability of Section 2 on the function performed by the 
elected official. The language iS only and uncompromisingly premised on the fact of nomination 
or election." Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 250-51 (11th Cir. 1987). 
86. The Dillard court acknowledged the difficulty in drawing lines based on government 
function. "A search for a definition of what constitutes legislative and what constitutes executive 
activity in government invariably leads to the conclusion that there is no bright line between the 
two realms." 831 F.2d at 252; see also Siege/man, 714 F. Supp. at 520 (rejecting functional 
distinctions). 
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Edwards 87 lends support to the proposition that even without specific 
congressional consideration, the Voting Rights Act should apply to 
single member offices. In the context of deciding whether the Act ap-
plied to elections for state judges, the court stated: 
An overriding principle which guides any analysis of the legislative his-
tory behind the Voting Rights Act is that the Act must be interpreted in 
a broad and comprehensive manner in accordance with congressional 
intent to combat racial discrimination of any kind in all voting practices 
and procedures. Thus, in the absence of any legislative history warrant-
ing a conclusion that section 2 does not apply to state judge elections, the 
only acceptable interpretation . . . is that such elections are covered. 88 
Moreover, the Senate Report on amended section 2 notes that 
while the cases it cites deal with typical situations of vote dilution, 
"Section 2 remains the major statutory prohibition of all voting rights 
discrimination."89 The Report also states that section 2 "prohibits 
practices which, while episodic and not involving permanent struc-
tural barriers, result in the denial of equal access to any phase of the 
electoral process for minority group members. "90 
Although Congress did not create the single-member office exemp-
tion, the Butts court argued that the Supreme Court implicitly created 
the exemption in City of Port Arthur v. United States. 91 This interpre-
tation of Port Arthur is flawed for a variety of reasons. First, if valid, 
the "implicit holding" the Butts court draws from Port Arthur would 
contravene Congress' desire to have the Act interpreted broadly to 
combat racial discrimination in all phases of voting. 92 Second, the 
Butts court, by pointing to the plaintiffs' failure in Port Arthur to raise 
a challenge to the runoff for the mayor's office, proves too much.93 If 
87. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 488 U.S. 955 
(1988). 
88. 839 F.2d at 1061-62 (emphasis in original). 
89. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 207. 
90. Id. 
91. 459 U.S. 159 (1982). In Port Arthur, the city, after expanding in size through annexation, 
submitted to the district court for preclearance a plan for reorganizing the city government. 
Under the 4-2-3 plan, the city would be divided into four single-member districts, Districts 1 
through 4. 
District 5, comprising Districts 1 and 4 would elect another member, as would District 6, 
which combined Districts 2 and 3. Three additional members would be elected at large, one 
each from Districts 5 and 6, the third at large seat to be occupied by the mayor and to have 
no residency requirement. All Council seats would be governed by a majority-vote rule, that 
is, run-offs would be required if none of the candidates received a majority of the votes cast. 
459 U.S. at 165. The district court rejected the proposed plan because of its adverse impact on 
the minority community. The court added, however, that if the plan were modified to eliminate 
the majority-vote requirement with respect to the two nonmayoral, at-large candidates, and to 
permit election to these two seats to be made by plurality vote, the court would consider the 
defect remedied. The Court affirmed the district court's decision. 459 U.S. at 168. 
92. Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d at 1061. 
93. The Supreme Court "made no mention of a similar run-off requirement for the election of 
mayor. The later run-off was not even challenged." Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 
148 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied. 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 
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the plaintiffs never raised a challenge to the mayor's office, the Court 
should not go out of its way to address an issue the parties never 
raised.94 Third, the Siege/man court notes that "the Port Arthur deci-
sion does not address why" the concept of vote dilution was not ap-
plied to the position of mayor.95 "[T]here is no discussion about 
which of the attributes of the office of mayor exempted it from a vote 
dilution challenge."96 Without a justification, the Siege/man court 
was unwilling to accept that Port Arthur authorized an exemption for 
single-member offices.97 Further, the Court has never endorsed this 
alleged implicit holding. In sum, the Supreme Court has neither im-
plicitly nor explicitly held that single-member offices are exempt from 
section 2. 
So far this section has demonstrated that neither Congress nor the 
Supreme Court decreed an exemption for single-member offices. The 
only remaining possible justification for an exemption is the theoretical 
justification offered by the "share of" approach. Essentially, this ap-
proach argues that allowing challenges to single-member offices is the-
oretically inconsistent with the concept of vote dilution. But if one 
could show that elections for single-member offices and the conduct of 
these officeholders violate the theoretical justifications for section 2, 
then they should not be exempt. But what is the theory behind section 
2, and what are the goals the section was designed to achieve? The 
next Part addresses these issues. 
II. THE GOAL OF SECTION 2: PROVIDING MINORITY GROUPS 
WITH AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY To ELECT AND To 
PARTICIPATE IN THE PoLmCAL PROCESS 
A coherent theory of section 2 must give meaning to both prongs 
of the section: the opportunity to elect, and the opportunity to partici-
pate. 98 Unfortunately, when Congress amended section 2, it concen-
trated more on the mechanics of proving a violation than it did on 
articulating a vision of equality in the political process.99 For instance, 
94. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981) ("We decline to 
consider this argument since it was not raised by either of the parties here or below."); see also 
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977). 
95. Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 519 n.21 (M.D. 
Ala. 1989). 
96. Siege/man, 714 F. Supp. at 519 n.21. 
97. Siege/man, 714 F. Supp. at 519 n.21. 
98. As the reader will see, thinking about these as separate prongs may create a false dichot-
omy because one should understand the political process as a whole, not as divided into pieces. 
But for ease of understanding, this distinction will be maintained for now. 
99. The Senate Report speaks occasionally about the goals of the Act in general and § 2 in 
particular. For example, the Report states that the Bill will insure "that the effort to achieve full 
participation for all Americans in our democracy will continue in the future." SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 181. But what exactly does Congress mean by "full participation"? The Report 
does not offer a complete model of full participation. Instead of articulating a vision of equal 
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the Senate Report develops a totality-of-the-circumstances test for sec-
tion 2 violations, but it does not define equality of political opportuni-
ties.100 The Supreme Court compounded this lack of guidance in 
Thornburg v. Gingles 101 by giving only limited substance to the oppor-
tunity-to-elect prong and by not addressing the opportunity-to-partici-
pate prong. To compensate for this lack of guidance, this Part draws 
on the work of a number of commentators in an attempt to state what 
it means to have an equal opportunity (1) to elect candidates of a 
group's choice and (2) to participate in the political process. 
Section II.A discusses the Supreme Court's treatment of the op-
portunity to elect. Section II.A also outlines the benefits that flow 
from an equal opportunity to elect. Ensuring that these benefits ac-
crue to minority groups should be an important goal of section 2. Sec-
tion II.B, drawing on the work of Professor Kathryn Abrams, 
provides a model of full participation in the political process that un-
derstands the process as more than merely voting. Section II.B then 
outlines the benefits that flow from ensuring an equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process. Section II.C concludes that the 
overarching goal of section 2 should be to increase civic inclusion in 
the political process by decreasing the effects of racial discrimination 
in this process. 
participation in the political process, Congress seems more interested in emphasizing that a re· 
suits standard is a return to the pre-Bolden understanding of§ 2. See, e.g., id. at 193. 
100. The totality-of-the-circumstances test, which the Senate Report develops, consists of 
factors for the courts to use in determining whether a particular practice results in an unequal 
opportunity to participate in the political process or elect a candidate of a minority group's 
choice. Id. at 206-07. The Senate report specifically mentions the following typical factors as 
evidence of an unequal opportunity to elect candidates and participate in the political process: 
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision 
that touched the right of members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to 
participate in the democratic process; 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially 
polarized; 
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or 
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have 
been denied access to that process; 
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision 
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which 
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in 
the jurisdiction. 
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence 
to establish a violation are: 
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the 
particularized needs of the members of the minority group. 
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qua!· 
ification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
101. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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A. Giving Meaning to the Opportunity To Elect 
The Supreme Court's only decision on amended section 2, Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, is disappointing for two reasons. First, the opinion 
addresses just the opportunity to elect, perhaps reserving for another 
day an opportunity-to-participate claim. And second, the decision 
creates confusion about the relationship between the Court's test for 
vote dilution and the statutory test outlined in the Senate Report. 
Overall, the Court fails to give full meaning to the opportunity to 
elect. Understanding the benefits produced by equal electoral oppor-
tunities gives fuller meaning to the opportunity to elect. 
1. The Supreme Court Gives Limited Meaning in 
Thornburg v. Gingles. 
In Thornburg v. Gingles, 102 plaintiffs challenged the use of six 
multi-member districts in North Carolina's legislative reapportion-
ment. The Court in Gingles focused on the opportunity to elect and 
did not address the opportunity-to-participate language of section 2.103 
The Court's characterization of the plaintiff's claim reveals this electo-
ral focus. 104 Moreover, the Court concentrated solely on elections 
when it discussed the essence of section· 2.105 
The Court outlined three factors (the Tripartite Test) required to 
prove that the use of multi-member districts caused vote dilution. 
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district. Otherwise, as in the case of an integrated dis-
trict, the multi-member or at-large structure cannot be responsible for 
a minority group's inability to elect its candidates. 106 Second, the mi-
nority group must be able to show its political cohesiveness.107 Third, 
the minority group must demonstrate that the white majoritr usually 
votes as a bloc, thus enabling it to defeat the minority's preferred can-
102. 478 U.S. at 30. 
103. 
We have no occasion to consider whether § 2 permits, and if it does, what standards 
should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that the use of a multi-
member district impairs its ability to influence elections. 
478 U.S. at 46-47 n.12. 
104. "Appellees contend that the legislative decision to employ multimember, rather than 
single-member, districts in the contested jurisdictions dilutes their votes by submerging them in a 
white majority, thus impairing their ability to elect representatives of their choice." 478 U.S. at 
46 (footnotes omitted). 
105. "The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts 
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black 
and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." 478 U.S. at 47. 
106. 478 U.S. at SO. 
107. According to the Court: "If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be 
said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group 
interests." 478 U.S. at 51. 
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didate. 108 "The latter two of these factors may be demonstrated by a 
showing that voting in the jurisdiction is highly racially polarized."109 
Although the Court stated a three-element test for vote dilution, it 
left uncertain the relationship between its test and the Senate Report's 
totality-of-the-circumstances test. 110 The Court added the require-
ment of a geographically compact majority to the statutory factors.11 1 
The Court treated the other elements of the totality-of-the-circum-
stances test as "supportive of, but not essential to," a minority voter's 
case.112 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, chastised the 
majority for replacing the totality-of-the-circumstances test with its 
tripartite test.113 The lower courts have treated the uncertain relation-
ship between the Court's test and the totality-of-the-circumstances test 
in various ways.114 
While the relationship between the Court's test and the statutory 
test may be uncertain, the Court exhibits a clearer understanding of 
inequalit~ in the opportunity to elect. For the Court, an inequality in 
the opportunity to elect is rooted in a very traditional concept of vote 
dilution: a minority group is numerically submerged in a majority ju-
risdiction.115 If voting is racially polarized, then the preferences of the 
108. The interaction of white and black bloc voting produces racially polarized voting. A 
showing of racially polarized voting demonstrates that a minority group will be thwarted in at-
large elections by the majority group voting along racial lines. The court's requirement of the 
usual predictability of the majority's success distinguished structural dilution from the mere loss 
of an occasional election. 478 U.S. at 51. 
109. Smith v. Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (E.D. Ark. 1988), ajfd., 488 U.S. 988 (1988). 
110. See Abrams, "Raising Politics Up'~· Minority Political Participation & Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 464-65 (1988). 
111. 478 U.S. at 50. 
112. 478 U.S. at 49 n.15. 
113. Justice O'Connor noted: "As shaped by the Court today, then, the basic contours of a 
vote dilution claim require no reference to most of the 'Zimmer factors' ••• which were high-
lighted in the Senate Report." 478 U.S. at 92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
114. On the one hand, some courts have downplayed the tripartite test to the point of ignor-
ing its requirements. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 293-94 (M.D. Ala. 
1986), affd. in part and remanded in part, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987), reinstated on 
remand, 679 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (M.D. Ala. 1988). In contrast, courts have held that satisfying 
the tripartite test is essential to a vote dilution claim. See, e.g., Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. 
School Dist., 804 F.2d 469, 471-72 (8th Cir. 1986); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1199-
204 (S.D. Miss. 1987); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (C.D. Ill.), appeal 
dismissed. 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1987). 
115. The Court concentrated on two typical methods of vote dilution caused by the location 
of minority voters, fracturing and packing. Fracturing occurs when district lines are drawn so 
that a minority group is dispersed into districts in which the minority cannot constitute a major-
ity. In contrast, packing occurs when a minority group is concentrated in districts in which they 
comprise an excessive majority. Thus, the minority group may have more than enough votes to 
win one district, but could win two districts if the districts were drawn differently. For a discus-
sion of these methods, see Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 V AND. L. 
REv. 523, 553 (1973); Engstrom & Wildgen, Pruning Thorns from the Thicket: An Empirical 
Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 465, 465-66 (1977). 
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minority group will be cancelled out. Moreover, vote dilution is evil 
because it 
not only deprives minority voters of their pref erred representatives, it 
also leaves them effectively unrepresented because it allows those elected 
to ignore minority interests without fear of the political consequences. 
In a very real sense, racially polarized voting perpetuates the effects of 
past discrimination.116 
2. The Benefits of Equal Opportunities To Elect Candidates of a 
Minority Group's Choice 
Correcting and preventing the evil produced by vote dilution is ob-
viously one of the benefits of equal electoral opportunity. But to un-
derstand how to ensure equal electoral opportunities, one must 
understand the other benefits that flow from equalizing these opportu-
nities. These are benefits associated with having an elected representa-
tive of a minority group's choice in the government. This section 
discusses those benefits. 
Some of the benefits produced by minority elected officials are fa-
miliar: they are those benefits traditionally associated with integra-
tion.111 The election of minority officials symbolizes that membership 
on a governing body is not reserved for white citizens.118 And the 
election of minority officials provides role models for the minority 
community.119 
In addition, the election of minority officials ensures that minority 
positions will at least be aired in the councils of government.120 The 
election of minority officials may have the practical effect of encourag-. 
ing interaction between these officials and nonminority officials.121 
Moreover, minority officials may operate as a "crucial lever" for ob-
taining the benefits that must be bargained for in the political pro-
cess.122 For example, a black city councilmember may help his 
116. Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1463 (M.D. Ala. 1988), 
affd. sub nom. Dillard v. Chilton City Commn., 868 F.2d 1274 (1989) (citation omitted). 
117. See, e.g., Howard & Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the 
Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1615, 1627 & 1631-32 (1983); see also 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (Powell, J.) (recognizing the value 
of diversity). 
118. See, e.g., A. THERNSTROM, supra note 1, at 239-40; Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: 
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 173, 214-15 (1989). 
119. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (recognizing the role 
model theory but rejecting it as justification for a race-based layoff plan). 
120. See Abrams, supra note 110, at 500. 
121. See L. CoLE, BLACKS IN POWER 222 (1976) (the presence of black elected officials 
sensitizes white elected officials); M. JEWELL & s. PATIERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 197-98, 211-12 (4th ed. 1986) (national and state legislators look to their 
colleagues with specialized knowledge to guide decision making); Karlan, supra note 118, at 216-
19. 
122. Backstrom, Problems of Implementing Redistricting, in REPRESENTATION AND REDIS-
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constituents secure better city services. And the election of minority 
officials may increase grass-roots participation in the political process 
among the minority community members by creating a sense of con-
nection with minority offici~s. 123 This final benefit illustrates that the 
opportunity to elect and the opportunity to participate in the political 
process often overlap. 
B. Giving Meaning to the Opportunity To Participate 
This section, drawing on the work of commentators, depicts a 
political process that includes more than simply voting. An interpre-
tation of section 2 that gives full meaning to the equal opportunity to 
participate must protect activities that precede as well as follow elec-
tions. Both minority and nonrninority citizens receive the benefits of a 
political process that ensures the equal opportunity to participate. 
1. A Model Giving Meaning to the Opportunity To Participate. 
Although the Gingles Court focused exclusively on the opportunity 
to elect, a number of commentators have been addressing the opportu-
nity-to-participate language of section 2. These scholars stress that the 
political process concerns more than a single event - the election of a 
candidate. Instead, taking part in the political process means both 
pre- and post-election participation, as well as participation not di-
rectly linked to an election.124 "[C]ourts should consider a variety of 
activities - from participating in party caucuses to consulting with 
elected representatives - as important components of political oppor-
tunity."125 Similarly, the ability of a minority group's elected repre-
sentatives to participate in the governing process should be considered. 
If a minority group can elect candidates, but these candidates are un-
able to engage in the process because of racially motivated impedi-
ments, then section 2 should protect the minority group. 
Professor Abrams suggests that courts replace their current focus 
solely on electoral opportunity with a model of "interactive participa-
tion."126 This model concentrates on group interaction in the broad 
TRICTING lssuES, supra note 28, at 58; see also Morris, Black Electoral Participation and the 
Distribution of Public Benefits, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 1, at 283 ("The evi-
dence from a growing body of research clearly indicates that black electoral participation influ-
ences the distribution of public benefits at the local level."); Campbell & Feagin, Black Politics in 
the South: A Descriptive Analysis, 37 J. POL. 129, 153-56 (1975); McDonald, The Quiet Revolu-
tion in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1276-79 (1989). 
123. See, e.g., c. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 45-47 (1970); 
Montague, The Voting Rights Act Today, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 52, 56 (1988); Note, Affirm-
ative Action and Electoral Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1811, 1813-14 (1981). 
124. Abrams, supra note 110, at 472-74. See generally Karlan, supra note 118; Guinier, 
Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 
(1989). 
125. Abrams, supra note 110, at 474. 
126. Id. at 488-94. 
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range of political activities. Under this expansive view, courts wou1d 
consider evidence that "minorities had been excluded from caucuses 
or avoided by candidates, as well as the failure of legislators and 
legislative policy to respond to the articu1ated interests of these 
groups."127 Where direct evidence was unavailable, courts wou1d look 
to factors likely to produce failures of interaction. Important indica-
tors would be discriminatory attitudes and the current effects of past 
discrimination. 12s 
Though Congress did not articu1ate a vision of full participation in 
the political process when it amended the Act, it did identify factors 
that would be useful in proving a violation of the Act. 129 These factors 
encompass an expansive approach to the political process beyond mere 
voting.130 In addition, the Court has incorporated a broad vision of 
the political process into prior voting rights cases.131 Similarly, a few 
lower courts have taken an expanded view of the political process in 
section 2 cases.132 
2. The Benefits of Equalized Opportunity To Participate 
This section examines the benefits produced by the Abrams model 
of the equal opportunity to participate. The benefits of equalized op-
127. Id. at 493. 
· 128. Id. The Senate Report (factors 1, 2, 4, 5, 6) also recognizes these as important indica-
tors of unequal opportunities to participate in the political process. See supra note 100. 
129. See supra note 100 for the factors comprising the totality-of-the-circumstances test. 
130. See id. for a list of the Senate factors. For example, Senate factors 1 and 5 address 
discrimination in a jurisdiction not necessarily linked to voting. The first additional factor fo-
cuses on the responsiveness of elected officials. 
131. Professor Abrams identifies three lines of cases in which an expansive understanding of 
the political process informs the Court's decisions. See Abrams, supra note 110, at 472-75. In 
the "White Primary" cases, the Court viewed the political process as a series of interrelated 
events, each significant to the outcome of the general election. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). . 
The second line of cases involves candidate access to the ballot. These cases stress that polit-
ical participation is a form of expression both by candidates and voters. See Munro v. Socialist 
Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Illinois State 
Bd. of Elects. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 
(1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
The third line of cases involve claims by a political group, rather than a racial group, that an 
election scheme diluted their votes. In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), the Court re-
jected a challenge by the Democratic Party to the plan for Indiana Legislature districts because it 
found that the Democrats could participate in the full range of the political process even if they 
could not directly elect a candidate. 478 U.S. at 131-32. 
132. For example, the Dillard court took an expanded view of the political process when it 
considered the effect of a proposed chairperson on the influence of commissioners elected by the 
minority group. "(T]he members elected by a racially fair district election method would have 
their voting strength and influence diluted." Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 296 
(M.D. Ala. 1986); see also Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1561-62 
(11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 
U.S. 936 (1988) (court identifies factors such as racial discrimination that diminish the opportu-
nity of a minority group to participate in the political process). 
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portunities to participate in the political process accrue not only to 
minority voters but to all citizens.133 The value to minority citizens 
includes an enhanced opportunity to alter political outcomes.134 A 
minority group may not have the votes to elect a candidate directly, 
but if the political process is open, the group may be able to influence 
specific outcomes by deliberating with others on matters of political 
importance.135 In turn, members of the community may recognize 
common interests they previously overlooked.136 Eventually this may 
weaken the barriers to coalition building that confront minority 
groups. This may then lead to an end to the divisiveness of racial 
politics.137 
Furthermore, an equal opportunity to engage in the process pro-
duces benefits for all citizens by affirming that the political system is 
legitimate. Professor Abrams states that legitimacy means "those fea-
tures that make [a government] acceptable to those who live under it, 
and that make the laws enacted by it worthy of being followed." 138 A 
tension is inherent in a republican system: the system understands all 
citizens to be equal, but a comparatively small number of citizens ac-
tually makes the important government decisions.139 To retain legiti-
macy, this system must preserve the "premise of equality."140 
Citizeris• abilities to participate in all phases of the political process 
decrease this tension between representation and equality. Participa-
tion in the political process allows all those who do not exercise the 
133. See, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 51-74 (1987) (contending that whites are 
the primary beneficiaries of civil rights enforcement). 
134. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) ("the power to influence the 
political process is not limited to winning elections"); see also Alkalimat & Gills, Chicago -
Black Power v. Racism: Harold Washington Becomes Mayor, in THE NEW BLACK VOTE 53-180 
(R. Bush ed. 1984) (demonstrating how control over political outcomes can be an inducement to 
voter registration); Morris, Black Electoral Participation and the Distribution of Public Benefits in 
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 1, at 271-85 (identifying belief of black activists that 
increased political participation can affect outcomes). 
135. See, e.g., s. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 183-208 (1973) (noting the 
correlation between membership in private, voluntary organizations and political participation). 
136. See, e.g., Bush, Oakland: Grassroots Organizing Against Reagan, in THE NEW BLACK 
VOTE, supra note 134, at 342-48 (explaining how previously disaffected minority voters were 
mobilized by the Peace and Justice Organization); Bush, Black Enfranchisement, Jesse Jackson, 
and Beyond, in id. at 24-26 (explaining bow previously disaffected minority voters were mobil-
ized by the People Organized for Welfare and Economic Reform and the candidacy of Harold 
Washington). 
137. ''There is even evidence, although tentative and anecdotal, that increased minority polit-
ical participation is breaking down patterns of racial polarization and bloc voting." McDonald, 
supra note 122, at 1278 n.166. 
138. Abrams, supra note 110, at 478-79; see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105 
(1980) (noting that rights to participation in the political process are "critical to the functioning 
of an open and effective democratic process"). 
139. "The tension between majority rule and minority representation defines a fundamental 
dilemma of democratic political theory." Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional 
Representation, 94 YALE L. REV. 163, 166 (1984). 
140. Abrams, supra note 110, at 479-81. 
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final decision to attempt to influence those who do. Thus, all citizens 
benefit. 141 
C. Combining the Opportunity To Elect and the Opportunity To 
Participate into an Overarching Theory 
Thus far this Part has treated the opportunity to elect and the op-
portunity to participate in the political process separately. While 
treating these prongs separately helps to identify the benefits associ-
ated with them, this section combines the prongs to identify an over-
arching goal for section 2. This section argues that the goal of section 
2 is to increase civic inclusion in the entire political process by decreas-
ing racial discrimination in the process. 
According to Professor Pamela Karlan, combining the opportunity 
to elect and the opportunity to participate produces an overarching 
goal: "civic inclusion."142 Civic inclusion means access to the broad 
range of governmental processes from political meetings to election of 
officials and effective representation by those officials.143 The Supreme 
Court has recognized this goal of civic inclusion on a number of occa-
sions.144 Additionally, Karlan suggests that Congress, in amending 
section 2, reaffirmed its commitment to civic inclusion as the goal of 
section 2.145 
Civic inclusion combines the benefits produced by giving full 
meaning to the opportunity to elect and participate. Thus, Professor 
Karlan concludes that civic inclusion promotes "a sense of connected-
ness to the community ... ; greater readiness to acquiesce in govern-
mental decisions and hence broader consent and legitimacy; and more 
informed, equitable and intelligent decisionmaking."146 
Moreover, Congress recognized that a large barrier to civic inclu-
sion is racial discrimination: both its lingering effects147 and the pres-
141. See, e.g., Weale, Representation, Individualism, and Collectivism, 91 ETHICS 457, 463 
(noting participation in the process by a group's members mitigates "the inevitable disappoint-
ments of policymaking"); Note, supra note 123, at 1825-26 (arguing that increased minority 
participation in the legislative process will yield greater minority support for government action). 
142. Karlan, supra note 118, at 179. 
143. Karlan, supra note 118, at 180. 
144. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); 
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), affd. per curiam sub nom. East Carroll 
Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
145. Karlan, supra note 118, at 196-99. Karlan notes that a number of the Senate factors 
point to civic inclusion as the goal of § 2. For example, the election of minority officials (the 
seventh factor) and the responsiveness of officials to the. minority group (the first additional fac-
tor) both point to inclusion as the goal of§ 2. In addition, the first factor (a history of discrimi-
nation) and the fourth factor (whether minorities have been denied access to candidate slating) 
both measure exclusion from the political process. See supra note 100 (listing the Senate factors). 
146. Karlan, supra note 118, at 180. 
147. Prior discrimination in the political process can have continuing effects by lowering 
registration and turnout rates among minorities. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 
1413-14 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. City Council of Chicago v. Ketchum, 471 U.S. 
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ent effects of existing discrimination. 148 To attack discrimination, 
Congress revised section 2 to prohibit not only discrimination by state 
actors but also to prevent political processes from furthering the ef-
fects of private discrimination. 149 A number of the factors in the Sen-
ate Report focus on the pervasiveness of private racial discrimination 
in the political process.1so 
In sum, the goal of section 2 is to increase civic inclusion by de-
creasing the effects of racial discrimination in the political process. 
This understanding of the goal of section 2 provides a touchstone for 
determining whether a particular political practice or electoral struc-
ture violates the goals of section 2. Part III will use this understand-
ing of section 2 to determine whether techniques used to elect single-
member offices and the structure of these offices can frustrate the goals 
of section 2. If single-member offices hamper the achievement of civic 
inclusion, then excluding single-member offices from section 2's cover-
age is unjustified. 
III. APPLYING SECTION 2 TO SINGLE-MEMBER OFFICES 
To begin this analysis, this Part addresses the preliminary question 
of how the Gingles tripartite test applies to single-member offices. Sec-
tion III.A argues that the tripartite test should not apply to a claim 
that challenges both an election practice for a single-member office 
and the structure of an office. Section III.A also argues that if the test 
does apply, a challenge to a single-member office can satisfy the test. 
Section III.B demonstrates how the combination of at-large elections 
and concentration of power associated with single-member offices can 
thwart the goals of section 2. This Part concludes single-member of-
fices can diminish the equal opportunity of a minority group to elect 
1135 (1985); United States v. Marengo County Commn., 731F.2d1546, 1568 (11th Cir.), appeal 
dismissed & cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984). In addition, discrimination in educational and 
economic opportunities can also diminish participation in the political process. See Marengo 
County Commn., 731 F.2d at 1568; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 207 n.114 (poor living 
conditions caused by past discrimination depress minority political participation). 
148. When Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965, Senator Javits remarked that the 
purpose of the Act was "not only to correct an active history of discrimination ••• but also to 
deal with the accumulation of discrimination." 111 CONG. REc. 8295 (1965). The Senate report 
also noted "that voting practices and procedures that have discriminatory results perpetuate the 
effects of past purposeful discrimination." SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 218. 
149. See, e.g., Note, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: An Approach to the Results Test, 39 
VAND. L. REv. 139, 172 (1986) ("Congress, therefore, revised section 2 to prohibit election 
practices that accommodate or amplify the effect that private discrimination has in the voting 
process."). 
150. For a list of the Senate factors, see supra note 100. Factor 2 (racially polarized voting) 
concentrates on the interplay between election practices and private racial discrimination by vot-
ers. Factor 4 (denial of access to slating procedures) also focuses on private racial discrimina-
tion. Similarly, factor 6 (racial campaign appeals) highlights the impact of private racial 
discrimination on the political participation of minority groups. 
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candidates of its choice and participate in the political process, and, 
thus, these offices should be open to section 2 suits. 
A. Answering the Preliminary Question: How Does the Tripartite 
Test Apply to Single-Member Posts? 
Courts have assumed that satisfying the Gingles tripartite test is a 
prerequisite to a finding of vote dilution under section 2.151 Hence, 
one might assume that satisfying the Gingles factors would be a pre-
requisite to a successful challenge to a single-member office. Advo-
cates of the "share of" approach would quickly embrace this 
interpretation because it may seem peculiarly difficult for plaintiffs 
contesting elections for single-members offices to satisfy the first of the 
Gingles factors: a showing of a geographically compact majority in a 
single-member district. The remaining two Gingles factors, essentially 
a showing of polarized voting, would not present unique problems for 
plaintiffs alleging that an election practice for a single-member office 
violated section 2.152 Consequently, this section will focus on the im-
pact of the first factor on single-member offices. 
The first Gingles factor requires a minority group to show that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority 
in a single-member district. 153 Advocates of the "share of" approach 
would argue that this prong bars any challenges to single-member of-
fices because the minority group cannot constitute a majority in the 
only district possible - the entire jurisdiction.154 But this reasoning 
151. In particular, courts have held that satisfying the first element of the tripartite test, 
geographic compactness, is an essential condition of a § 2 challenge. See, e.g., McNeil v. Spring-
field Park Dist., 851F.2d937, 942 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1769 (1989) (using the 
geographic compactness as a litmus test); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1199-204 (S.D. 
Miss. 1987); Potter v. Washington County, 653 F. Supp. 121, 129 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (minority 
group not numerous enough to be entitled to a majority black single-member district). 
152. This is not to say that the measurement of polarized voting is uncontroversial, rather it 
is to say that the techniques for measuring polarized voting would be the same for a multi-
member or single-member office. See generally Grofman, Migalski & Novielo, The "Totality of 
Circumstances Test" in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science 
Perspective, 7 LAW & POLY. 199 (1985); Engstrom & McDonald, Quantitative Evidence in Vote 
Dilution Litigation: Political Participation and Polarized Voting, 17 URB. LAW. 369 (1985); Ja-
cobs & O'Rourke, Racial Polarization in Vote Dilution Cases Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act: The Impact a/Thornburg v. Gingles, 3 J.L. & POL. 295, 317-35 (1986). 
While a majority of the court in Thornburg v. Gingles joined Justice Brennan's statement of 
the legal test for polarized voting, only three other members of the court accepted his views on 
whether the reasons underlying patterns of voting by race are a proper subject in assessing po-
larized voting. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 61-74 (1986). For critiques of the Gingles 
Court's approach to polarized voting, see Engstrom & McDonald, Definitions, Measurements, 
and Statistics: Weeding the Thicket, 20 URB. LAW. 175 (1988); Jacobs & O'Rourke, supra, at 
347-53; Wildger, Adding Thornburg to the Thicket: The Ecological Fallacy and Parameter Con-
trol in Vote Dilution Cases, 20 URB. LAW. 155 (1988). · 
153. For a review of the Gingles factors, see supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
154. For example, a "share of" advocate would argue that if 40% of a town's voters are 
black, they cannot compriSe a majority in the only district relevant for a mayor's election - the 
entire town. · 
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can be rebutted in two ways. First, the Gingles opinion suggests possi-
ble limits on the reach of its tripartite test. And second, commentators 
have argued persuasively that the first prong of the test unjustifiably 
restricts section 2 challenges. 
The tripartite test may not apply to single-member offices because 
of limiting language in the Gingles opinion. The Court limited the 
potential application of the tripartite test in two respects. The Court 
noted that it was not dealing with or developing standards for a claim 
"brought by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and com-
pact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that 
the use of a multi-member district impairs its ability to influence elec-
tions. "155 This caveat leaves undeveloped the standards applicable to 
a single-member office since a challenge to a single-member office 
would probably involve a minority group alleging diminished opportu-
nity to influence as well as elect. ls6 
In addition, the Court reserved judgment on whether the standards 
developed for a multi-member vote dilution claim in Gingles would 
apply "to other sorts of vote dilution claims."157 Plaintiffs challenging 
a single-member office would argue that an at-large election for the 
office dilutes their voting strength and the structure of the office dimin-
ishes their ability to participate in the political process. This would be 
a hybrid vote dilution-opportunity to influence claim. This may fall 
under the "other sorts of vote dilution claims" to which the tripartite 
test may not apply. 
At minimum, the limits in the Court's opinion and its focus on 
elections suggest that the tripartite test would be restricted to vote di-
lution claims. Thus, if a plaintiff brought a claim of candidate diminu-
tion or disenfranchisement, satisfying the tripartite test should not be a 
prerequisite to a challenge. For example, if the plaintiff challenged a 
single-member office, like a mayor, for withholding candidate registra-
tion information, the plaintiff should not have to show that he was a 
member of a group that could form a majority in a single-member 
district. 158 
In addition, the first element of the tripartite test unjustifiably re-
stricts section 2 challenges because it focuses exclusively on the oppor-
155. Gingles, 418 U.S. at 46-47 n.12. 
156. The Court would probably recognize an ability-to-influence claim even if the plaintiffs 
could not comprise a majority in a single-member district. For a fuller discussion see Karlan, 
supra note 118, at 206 n.129 ("it seems likely that the Supreme Court would hold 'influence' 
claims to be cognizable under Section 2"). Lower courts have recognized ability-to-influence 
claims in cases where the minority was not compact enough to constitute a majority. See, e.g., 
East Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson, 691 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. La. 1988) (recognizing an 
influence claim even when the minority could not constitute a majority in a single-member 
district). 
157. 478 U.S. at 47 n.12. 
158. See, e.g., Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (no 
showing of a compact majority required in a challenge to a mayor's actions). 
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tunity to elect, ignoring the opportunity to participate.159 If a single-
member officeholder diminishes the equal opportunity of minority citi-
zens to participate in the political process, this should be remediable 
whether the minority group comprises 60 percent of the jurisdiction or 
20 percent. After all, if the minority group comprised 60 percent of 
the electorate it could protect itself in the political process by voting 
the official out of office. In contrast, a minority group comprising 20 
percent of the electorate needs the protection of section 2. 
Therefore, this Note concludes that the tripartite test shoul!i not 
apply to single-member offices. Instead, a court should draw on the 
factors outlined in the Senate Report and tailor the factors to single-
member offices. Courts should continue to use polarization as a pre-
requisite for a section 2 violation because it highlights a breakdown in 
the coalition-building process normally found in politics.160 In addi-
tion, courts should focus on the Senate factors that indicate an ine-
quality in the opportunities to participate in the political process.161 
But suppose that the tripartite test does apply to a vote dilution 
challenge to single-member offices: would this bar challenges to sin-
gle-member offices? The answer is no, according to the Stallings and 
Dillard courts. In Stallings, for example, blacks comprised 15.3 per-
cent of the voting age population of the county.162 If the single-mem-
ber county commissioner was to remain single-member, blacks could 
not be a majority in the only district possible: the entire county. But 
because the court was willing to consider expanding the county com-
mission from one member to three or five members, the plaintiffs, who 
showed they were a majority in one of the districts, were able to chal-
lenge the single-member office.163 
The Dillard court displayed a similar attitude but did not have to 
face the question of dividing the county into new districts because the 
parties had already created them. In Dillard, blacks constituted 15.9 
percent of the voting age population of Calhoun County.164 If the 
159. For criticisms of the geographic compactness requirement, see Karlan, supra note 118, 
at 180-82, 199-205; Abrams, supra note 110, at 465-69. 
160. See supra notes 107-09, 115-16 and accompanying text on polarized voting. 
161. For challenges to single-member offices, the Senate factor dealing with the responsive-
ness of elected officials to a minority group would be important. See supra note 100. A court 
should examine the responsiveness not only of elected officials to a minority group but also to the 
group's elected representatives. In addition, the presence of discrimination in the political pro-
cess would indicate an unequal opportunity to participate. See supra note 100; Abrams, supra 
note 110, at 510-13. 
162. City of Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 
(1988). 
163. 829 F.2d at 1563. The difficulty with this approach lies in the fact that the court must 
have a proposed districting scheme in mind when it determines whether the minority group can 
comprise a majority in a district. For a discussion of this problem, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 88-92 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
164. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 247 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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court had held that the chairperson of the county commission had to 
remain at-large, then the black voters could never have comprised a 
majority in the county. But because the court agreed to have the posi-
tion of chairperson rotate among the five district commissioners, 
blacks could comprise a majority in one of the districts, and thus the 
office was open to challenge.16s 
From the Dillard court's approach, one can see how minority vot-
ers could meet the tripartite test for a challenge to an at-large city 
council president's office, for example.166 Although it is clear how this 
approach would apply to a council president's office, it is less obvious 
how a challenge to a mayor's office would be acceptable under this 
approach. In a town comprised of 30 percent minority voters, they 
could not constitute a majority in the only relevant district, the whole 
town. This assumes, however, that the mayor's office must remain as 
presently constituted. If, instead, the office could be shared or the 
mayor-council form of government changed to a city commission with 
a rotating chairperson, 167 the jurisdiction would be effectively subdi-
vided into more than one district, and minority voters could satisfy the 
first Gingles factor. 
B. Determining How Single-Member Offices Violate the Goals of the 
Voting Rights Act 
Section III.A argued that satisfying the Gingles tripartite test 
should not be a prerequisite for challenging a single-member office 
under section 2. Section III.A also demonstrated that if the tripartite 
test is a prerequisite, a section 2 challenge to a single-member office 
could satisfy the test's requirements. Section III.B will show how sin-
gle-member offices may actually violate the goals of section 2. As sec-
tion II.C. argued, the opportunity to elect and to participate combine 
to form an overarching goal of civic inclusion. While the opportunity 
to elect and participate should be thought of as a package, this section 
will discuss them separately for two reasons. The first is clarity. The 
second reason is to follow courts who frequently analyze the prongs 
separately. Yet when a violation of section 2 is associated with a sin-
gle-member office, this violation diminishes both the opportunity to 
elect and the opportunity to participate. Thus, the violation hampers 
civic inclusion. 
165. 831 F.2d at 253. 
166. Suppose white voters comprise 70% of the population and minorities comprise 30%, 
with whites a majority in seven of the city districts and blacks a majority in the other three. 
Suppose that the council consists of ten members chosen by district and the council president 
chosen at large. If the council president must remain an at-large jurisdiction-wide office, minori-
ties could not comprise a majority in the entire city. But ifthe council presidency can be rotated 
among the council members, as in Dillard, then blacks do comprise a majority in three of the 
districts and the at-large election for the office could be challenged. 
167. See infra notes 245-46. 
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As this Note has suggested, single-member offices can violate sec-
tion 2 in ways similar to multi-member offices and in ways unique to 
single-member offices.168 As an example of the former, suppose a ju-
risdiction imposes a primary runoff requirement in an election for an 
office.169 This requirement can dilute minority voting strength 
whether the election is for a single- or multi-member office.17° Simi-
larly, if the holder of either type of office is unresponsive to his minor-
ity constituents, this diminishes equal opportunity to participate in the 
political process.171 Because these cases could be addressed under the 
traditional analysis of electoral discrimination,172 this section will not 
focus on single-member violations that resemble those caused by 
multi-member offices. 
Instead, this section focuses on violations of section 2 peculiar to 
single-member offices which require an updated analysis. Specifically, 
one peculiar violation occurs when a single-member office combines 
selection by at-large election with a concentration of power that les-
sens the opportunity of minority voters or their elected officials to par-
ticipate in the political process. In this way, both the opportunity to 
elect and to participate are diminished, thwarting civic inclusion.-
168. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. 
169. Under a run-off requirement, candidates must obtain an absolute majority of the votes 
to win, rather than a plurality. If no candidate obtains a majority, a run-off election is required 
between the two top vote-getters. See Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINOR-
ITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note I, at 6. 
170. Chandler Davidson explains how a runoff requirement can dilute minority voting 
strength: 
The mandatory runoff precludes the possibility that a minority candidate will win office with 
a mere plurality if the white vote splits among several other candidates. In that situation, 
the minority candidate is forced into a runoff against a single white, behind whom the white 
voters can rally to produce a majority. 
Id. The discriminatory impact of run-off requirements has been recognized in a variety of con-
texts and by a variety of authors. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 
167 (1983); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Registration Barriers, supra note 
35; McDonald, The Majority Vote Requirement: Its Use and Abuse in the South, 11 URB. LAW. 
429 (1985); Note, Assessing the Legality of Runoff Elections Under the Voting Rights Act, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 876 (1986); Note, The Primary Runoff: Racism's Reprieve?, 65 N.C. L. REV. 
359 (1987); Note, Runoff Primaries: Is There a Discriminatory Result?, 2 J.L. & POL. 369 (1985). 
But two courts have denied that run-off requirements for single-member offices dilute minor-
ity voting strength. See Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1021 (1986); Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 686 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Ark. 1988), affd. in 
part & revd. in part, 890 F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989), affd., 902 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1990). While the 
Eighth Circuit recognized that a majority vote primary run-off could dilute minority voting 
strength, the court did not specifically address the impact of the run-off on single-member offices. 
Cf. Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 519 n.22 (M.D. Ala. 
1989). 
Both Butts and Whitfield, at the district court level, are incorrectly decided because they fail 
to recognize that a run-off requirement dilutes minority voting strength regardless of whether the 
underlying office being chosen is single- or multi-member. For a hypothetical example of vote 
dilution caused by a run-off for a single-member office, see Karlan, supra note 118, at 187 n.54. 
171. The Senate Report suggests that unresponsiveness is one indicator of unequal access to 
the political process. See supra note iOO; see also Abrams, supra note 110, at 510. 
172. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
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1. Diminishing an Equal Opportunity To Elect 
This section will demonstrate how single-member offices can pro-
duce an unequal opportunity to elect a candidate of a minority group's 
choice. Vote dilution produced by at-large elections for single-mem-
ber offices, combined with the lingering animosity to minority candi-
dates, causes this inequality. 
The Senate Report on the 1982 amendments to the Act states: "In 
the context of . . . racial bloc voting, and other factors, a particular 
election method can deny minority voters equal opportunity to partici-
pate meaningfully in elections."173 An analysis of at-large election 
systems will demonstrate how they dilute minority access to the polit-
ical process in exactly the way Congress intended to prohibit. 174 Sin-
gle-member offices are generally chosen at large because the 
jurisdiction as a whole is voting to fill one office. The at-large nature 
of single-member offices poses a significant barrier to a minority 
group's equal opportunity to elect.11s 
Although at-large systems are not per se unconstitutional,176 and 
may help minority groups in some situations, 177 the Court "has long 
recognized that ... at-large voting schemes may 'operate to minimize 
or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting 
population.' " 178 Critics of at-large systems argue that they were often 
173. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 211. 
174. Indeed, the Senate Report specifically mentions at-large elections. See, e.g., SENATll 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 207 (in discussing the diluting effects of election systems, the Report 
notes "Whitcomb, White, Zimmer, and their progeny dealt with electoral system features such as 
at-large elections."); Note, At-Large Elections and Vote Dilution: An Empirical Study, 19 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 1221 (1986) (arguing that the results test was designed to attack the vote 
dilution caused by at-large elections). 
175. This Note has observed, supra note 84 and accompanying text, that an office does not 
have to be elected at large to be single-member. However, the courts seem to treat at-large, 
jurisdiction-wide elections as a key component of single-member offices. Consequently, discus· 
sion of the at-large character of these offices is appropriate. 
176. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967). 
177. In theory, minority voters may benefit from at-large elections because they will hold the 
"swing" votes. Thus in a tight race between two candidates, the minority voters can determine 
the outcome by swinging their votes to one candidate. The swing vote theory, however, has a 
number of defects. First, the margin between the two candidates may be so great that the minor-
ity vote lacks influence. Second, the winning candidate may not be able to assess his level of 
minority support. Third, winning candidates do not always pay attention to minority groups 
after the election because the candidates are also in debt to white voters, voters whose interests 
may conflict with the minority's interest. See Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in 
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 1, at 9-10. Finally, minority groups often prefer to have 
at least one candidate of their choice in an election, rather than the opportunity to hold the 
balance of power in a number of elections. See L. HARRIS & AssoCIA TES, A STUDY OF RACIAL 
ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND TENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES Vol. I (Jan. 11, 1989) (finding, 
by a 91 percent majority, that blacks would prefers to have more blacks nominated to high office 
rather than remaining the swing votes). 
178. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (quoting Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 
73, 88 (1986) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965))). 
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adopted to dilute minority voting strength.179 At-large elections may 
diminish the equal opportunity to elect in two ways. First, at-large 
elections actually dilute minority voting strength by submerging mi-
nority voters in majority districts. Second, at-large elections decrease 
the ability of minority citizens and their candidates to participate in 
pre-election politics. 
The Court, in Gingles, explained how an at-large system dilutes 
minority voting strength. "The theoretical basis for this type of im-
pairment is that where minority and majority voters consistently pre-
fer different candidates, the majority by virtue of its numerical 
superiority will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters."180 
Racial bloc voting, in the context of an at-large system, allows a white 
majority to use the electoral structure to dilute minority voting 
strength.181 A number of studies demonstrate the discriminatory ef-
fects of at-large voting schemes.18z The Stallings court recognized the 
evils of an at-large office in the single-member office challenged in the 
case. The court linked the at-large character of the office to the office 
in Gingles. 183 
Critics of the view that the at-large character of single-member of-
fices diminishes the equal opportunity to elect might respond that 
black candidates and black voters are unsuccessful simply because 
they are affiliated with the wrong political party.184 Political affilia-
179. See, e.g., Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A 
Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra 
note 1, at 67-71; Note, The Constitutional Significance of the Discriminatory Effects of At-Large 
Elections, 91 YALE L.J. 974, 979 n.25 (1982). The Stallings court found that the at-large, single 
member commission was adopted for discriminatory purposes. City of Carrollton Branch of 
NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1552-53 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. 
City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1986). Whether or not an at-large 
system was adopted for a discriminatory purpose may be considered under the totality of the 
circumstances test, but intent is not necessary for a violation of§ 2. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44. 
180. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48. 
181. Consider a town with a voting age population of 10,000, governed by a town council of 
ten members, all elected at large. Seventy percent of the voters are white, while the remaining 30 
percent are members of protected minority groups under the Voting Rights Act. Suppose there 
is strong racial bloc voting, i.e., the whites vote as a group and the minority votes as a group for 
their preferred candidates and there is little crossover voting. Under this electoral system, whites 
could elect ten candidates while the minority group would elect none. This demonstrates the 
theoretical basis of dilution the court had in mind in Gingles. 
182. See Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Re-
examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra 
note 1, at 65-81; Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 85, 85 (1979); Note, supra note 174. 
183. -829 F.2d at 1549. 
184. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), black ghetto residents in Indianapolis, 
Indiana argued that their votes were being diluted by an at-large voting system for the state 
legislature. The Court found that the ghetto area voted Democratic, but in four of five elections 
from 1960 to 1968, Republicans carried the district. When the Democrats carried the district in 
1964, ghetto area senators and representatives were elected. The Court concluded: · 
[T]he failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges 
more as a function oflosing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting 
2232 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:2199 
tion, however, plays a diminished role in local elections because the 
majority are nonpartisan. 185 In addition, a critic might argue that an 
election is a numbers game lost by minority voters simply because 
white voters outnumber minority voters. After all, a critic might ar-
gue, if a town consisted of 70 percent Republicans and 30 percent 
Democrats, no one would have a legitimate complaint if the Demo-
crats never elected a mayor; they simply lacked the numbers. 186 Simi-
larly, why should the Voting Rights Act be implicated when, in a town 
that has 70 percent white voters and 30 percent minorities, the minor-
ity group never elects a mayor? Again, they simply lacked the 
numbers. 
The response to this objection is that race is significantly different 
from political affiliation. In the political party hypothetical, the Dem-
ocrats' losses do not cause concern because the Court assumes that the 
normal processes of political give-and-take enable the political minor-
ity to influence the process even though they may not be able to elect a 
candidate directly. 187 In contrast, this influence does not operate in 
jurisdictions with a history of discrimination and of racially polarized 
voting. 188 Often the present effects of past discrimination prevent a 
minority group from combining with majority voters to protect the 
group's interests. 189 
In addition a critic may argue that relying on the at-large character 
of elections for single-member offices is inappropriate because the at-
power of ghetto residents may have been "cancelled out" as the District Court held, but this 
seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls. 
Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 153; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83 (White, J., concurring in part) (argu-
ing that political affiliation should be taken into account). The district court in Gingles did take 
political affiliation into account, but still concluded that race rather than political affiliation 
played a far larger role in explaining voting patterns. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 365 
(E.D.N.C. 1984). 
185. See 49 MUN. Y.B. 181 (1982) (70.2% of municipal elections are nonpartisan). 
186. If the Republicans in the hypothetical had employed techniques that diluted Demo-
cratic voting strength, however, a court might hold that these techniques violated the Equal 
Protection clause. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1986). 
187. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (the Court, using this reasoning, refused to find an equal 
protection violation merely because an apportionment scheme made it difficult for Democrats to 
elect representatives of their choice.). 
188. See Berry & Dye, supra note 182, at 88; see also Abrams, supra note 110, at 506 ("The 
present effects of past discrimination prevent [black voters] from influencing or coalescing with 
white voters in ways that will preserve their voice in the politics of the district."); Note, Geometry 
and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 203 (1984) 
("The pluralist model of shifting alliances and coalitions has never, in fact, applied to blacks in 
American politics.") (footnote omitted). 
189. Abrams, supra note 110, at 506. Professor Abrams suggests this breakdown occurs 
because "(t]he lingering effects of past discrimination can make white voters resistant or insensi-
tive to minority perspectives, and can make minority voters reluctant to exchange views with 
others they may perceive as hostile or indifferent to their interests." Id. at 506 n.287; see also 
Guinier, supra note 124, at 424 n.138 ("Because of extreme racial polarization within the electo-
rate, the pluralist model does not work for blacks. The possibility of forming coalitions with like-
minded allies to aggregate minority political power into an electable majority fails where mem· 
bers of the majority consistently refuse to vote for minority sponsored candidates."). 
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large cases focus on multi-member bodies, while single-member offices 
involve one individual. The critic might add, the premise of a chal-
lenge to an at-large election system is that an alternative exists. Usu-
ally the alternative is election by districts created to give minority 
voters an equal opportunity to elect a representative.19° But in the 
case of single-member offices, according to the "share of" approach, 
no alternative to at-large election exists because there is only one dis-
trict (the entire jurisdiction) and it cannot be divided. For example, 
how could the at-larg~, city-wide election of a mayor be changed? 
This objection, however, is flawed because it assumes that the juris-
dictional lines must remain the same.191 If the boundaries were chal-
lenged and changed, it may be possible to create a black majority 
voting district.192 
Also, this critique assumes that the office deemed single-member 
must remain as it is presently constituted. That is, the "share of" 
approach assumes that a city council president must continue to be 
held by one person with the same powers originally invested in the 
office or that a mayor's office must be held by a single person with all 
the powers remaining in that office. This assumption, however, is not 
grounded on the Voting Rights Act or case law. As Part IV will argue 
and a number of cases have already demonstrated, a court has the 
power to modify the structure, as well as the power, of a single-mem-
ber office. If a court restructures a single-member post, then a racial 
minority group can comprise a majority in one or more districts, thus 
satisfying even the requirements of the "share of" approach.193 
At-large elections for single-member offices, besides diluting mi-
nority voting strength, also decrease the ability of minority citizens 
and their candidates to participate in the pre-election political process. 
Because at-large elections require an appeal to the entire electorate 
rather than a single district, "such elections require greater financial 
190. See Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971) (noting that single-member districts 
are the preferred remedy in place of multi-member districts); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 
755, 765-70 (1973). 
191. The Siege/man court does recognize this assumption. "This assumes, of course, that the 
boundaries in place are a given." Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. 
Supp. 5ll, 519 n.20 (M.D. Ala. 1989). 
192. "If those boundaries are challenged, however, the situation changes. By redrawing the 
city's external boundaries, it would in some cases be theoretically possible to create a black ma-
jority voting jurisdiction." Siege/man, 714 F. Supp. at 519 n.20. Because the chances of this 
kind of boundary change are minimal, this Note will not focus on that approach to single-mem-
ber offices. 
193. For example, in Dillard plaintiffs challenged a proposed county commission chairper-
son, an office traditionally held by one person and elected at large. The court suggested that this 
office be rotated among the five commission members chosen by district. Dillard v. Crenshaw 
County, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987). Since minority voters would comprise a majority in 
one of the districts, their representative would have one opportunity out of five to serve as 
chairperson. 831 F.2d at 248. In this way, an office and its powers traditionally held by one 
person were now, in effect, shared by five people. See also McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. 
Supp. 1015 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (doubling size of city council). 
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resources and put a premium on the endorsement of civic associations 
and, most important, local newspapers."194 Because these organiza-
tions are generally controlled by the white majority, blacks frequently 
are unable to obtain the support necessary for success in a city or 
county wide race. Black candidates who have garnered the support of 
the "establishment" are rarely "the most effective advocates of black 
interests."195 Similarly, an at-large electoral system gives political par-
ties "exceptional power over aspirants and elected officials because of 
the insurmountable odds confronting an unattached candidate."196 
The elected official will likely be in debt to a political party for his 
nomination and election. This indebtedness limits his independence. 
An official with majority support, especially white majority support in 
a racially polarized town, risks losing that backing if he embraces "mi-
nority proposals which are at war with the majority view on the same 
question." 197 
These characteristics of at-large elections often combine with lin-
gering animosity to minority candidates to produce an inequality in 
the opportunity to elect. 198 Surveys indicate that the higher the office 
for which a qualified black candidate is running, the less likely white 
citizens are to vote for the candidate. 199 This makes it particularly 
difficult for black candidates to be successful in elections for single-
member offices because these offices are typically greater in status than 
multi-member offices in a jurisdiction. The election of minority candi-
dates in a jurisdiction is relevant to the section 2 inquiry.200 The rec-
ord on the election of black candidates to single-member posts, such as 
194. Berry & Dye, supra note 182, at 88; see also United States v. Dallas County Commn., 
850 F.2d 1433, 1439 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting, in the context of at-large election, that "Dallas 
County's black citizens have a more difficult time garnering political strength than whites be-
cause of insurmountable social and economic barriers which separate the races."); Butts v. City 
of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 156 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986) (noting the 
impact on black candidates of the expense of running citywide in New York City in part because 
of the need for media coverage). 
195. Berry & Dye, supra note 182, at 88. This practice is known as co-opting. See Davidson 
& Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination of Historical 
and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 1, at 79. 
196. Washington, Does The Constitution Guarantee Fair and Effective Representation to All 
Interest Groups Making Up the Electorate, 17 How. L.J. 91, 107 (1971). 
197. Washington, supra note 196, at 108. 
198. See, e.g., L. CoLE, supra note 121, at 114 & 233 (1976) (suggesting that many white 
citizens and officials believe that black officials work to benefit black citizens without engaging in 
dialogue with all interest groups); Weinraub, Jackson Intends to Keep Bid Alive, N.Y. Times, 
June 19, 1988, at 20, col. 6 (Jesse Jackson argues that his candidacy is treated with disrespect); J. 
WILLIAMSON, A RAGE FOR ORDER: BLACK/WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
SINCE EMANCIPATION (1986) (noting the legacy of Reconstruction era stereotypes). Scholars 
argue that these attitudes may be based on Reconstruction Era fears of "Negro rule." Kennedy, 
Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship (Book Review), 98 YALE L.J. 521, 523-24 (1989). 
199. Focus Magazine, Trendletter 2 (1988) (supplement to Vol. 16, No. 4) (reporting results 
of 1987 Joint Center for Political Studies Gallup Survey). 
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982). 
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mayors, demonstrates a diminished level of participation.201 
2. Diminishing an Equal Opportunity To Participate 
Single-member offices, beside creating an inequality in the opportu-
nity to elect, can also diminish a minority group's equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process. A court should consider City of 
Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings 202 and Dillard v. Cren-
shaw County 203 as two paradigms for determining whether a single-
member office unlawfully diminishes the equal opportunity to partici-
pate in the political process. The common denominator of these viola-
tions is a concentration of power in a single-member office. This 
concentrated power can either directly diminish the opportunity of mi-
nority citizens to take part in the political process or indirectly dimin-
ish citizens' opportunity by diluting the influence of their elected 
representatives. 204 
In Stallings, a single county commissioner, elected at large, made 
all the government decisions for his county. Because the at-large elec-
201. See, e.g., Focus Magazine, Joint Center for Political Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, at 2 (Apr. 
1988). "Blacks with political aspirations have begun to saturate the majority-black jurisdictions, 
but they still have a difficult time winning in places where the majority of the electorate is white." 
Id.; Smothers, Why the Higher Rungs of Power Elude Black Politicians, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 
1989, § 4 at 4, col. 1; Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in Minority Vote Dilution, 
supra note 1, at 14 (noting that when a black candidate is elected mayor in Alabama, the town is 
usually small and blacks usually comprise an overwhelming percentage of the population). 
202. 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton 
Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988). See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the case. 
203. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the case. 
204. This approach might be termed "concentration of power'' analysis. To this section's 
approach, contrast United States v. Marengo County, 643 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Ala. 1986), affd. 
sub nom. Clark v. Marengo County, 811 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1987). This case raises the issue of 
whether courts should question concentration of power. The Marengo County court suggests 
that if the chairpersons were distinct from other members of the entities, then that might be a 
"persuasive justification" for allowing at-large chairpersons. 643 F. Supp. at 235. In contrast, 
this section suggests that if the chairpersons were distinct in the power they exercised, then they 
would be single-member offices and subject to this Note's analysis. Under this Note's approach, 
the chairpersons could violate the Dillard rationale because they would possess the power to 
diminish the influence of black elected officials chosen by district. 
To Marengo County compare United States v. Dallas County Commn., 661 F. Supp. 955 
(S.D. Ala. 1987), also authored by Judge Hand. There the court approved a plan that would 
provide for a revamped county commission consisting of four commissioners chosen by district, 
but would retain the probate judge of the county as the at-large chairperson of the commission. 
661 F. Supp. at 956-57. The government challenged this plan, arguing that it would not com-
pletely cure the violation because the probate judge position would be beyond the reach of black 
voters. Yet the government apparently conceded that this single-person office was less subject to 
challenge "because the duties of this single-person office are uniquely executive-judicial." 661 F. 
Supp. at 957. 
Although the court's description of the judge's actual powers as chairperson are sparse, the 
"chair'' presumably exercises greater powers than other members of the commission. Conse-
quently, this office would be considered single-member under this Note's analysis and subject to 
challenge. 
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tion for the commissioner in conjunction with racially polarized voting 
diluted black voting strength, blacks could not directly elect a repre-
sentative. 205 More importantly, concentrating all the government 
power in one official limited the opportunity of black citizens to par-
ticipate in the political process. If the single commissioner did not 
listen to the concerns of black citizens, they had no other outlet to 
participate in their county's political process.206 
Although few governments are organized like the single county 
commission in Stallings, 207 the case still teaches an important lesson. 
A court should be on guard against a situation where power is concen-
trated, either by law or by practice, in the hands of a single-member 
officeholder, and this power threatens the opportunity of minority citi-
zens to engage in the political process. 
Dillard208 provides the second paradigm for understanding how 
concentrated power in a single-member office can diminish the equal 
opportunity to participate. In Dillard, the court rejected the proposed 
position of county chairperson elected at large because the court 
feared that excessive power would gravitate to the chairperson. 209 In 
turn, this power could be used to diminish the opportunity for black 
elected officials to participate in government.21o 
One can imagine a similar process in which power in a town gravi-
tates to the mayor's office. For instance, a mayor may exercise his 
authority with little legislative oversight. When the city council does 
meet, it rubberstamps the mayor's decisions despite objections from 
beleaguered minority representatives on the council. Moreover, the 
mayor and the majority white elected councilmembers exclude minor-
ity elected councilmembers from important government decisions.211 
These decisions frequently disadvantage the minority community. For 
instance, their neighborhoods receive less than a proportionate share 
of spending. 212 
205. 829 F.2d at 1551-58. 
206. "The Carroll County Commissioner is the entire governing body for the county." In-
cluded among his powers was the ability to "appoint all minor officials of the county, whose 
election or appointment is not otherwise fixed by law." 829 F.2d at 1551 n.7. In addition, be-
cause the county commissioner was the sole legislative authority in the county, he could pass 
county ordinances on his own motion. Act of Dec. 13, 1982, No. 485 § 11, 1983 Ga. Laws 4656, 
4660. 
207. Only 24 or so counties out of 159 within the State of Georgia have authorized the single-
commissioner form of government. Brief for Respondents opposing petition for certiorari, at 12. 
208. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987). 
209. 831 F.2d at 252. 
210. 831 F.2d at 253. 
211. See, e.g., Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 334 (E.D. La. 1983) (all black legislators 
excluded from a secret meeting on a redistricting proposal held in the basement of the Senate 
chambers); see also H. BALL, D. KRANE & T. LAUTH, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE 162 (1982) 
(when the nine-member Richmond, Virginia city council decided to annex areas occupied pri-
marily by whites, the three black council members were excluded from the deliberations). 
212. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626 (1984) (court finds roads were unpaved as 
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Section 2 logically should reach this process known as "legislative 
exclusion. " 2 13 If minority citizens finally gain the equal opportunity 
to elect officials of their choice, this achievement should not be nulli-
fied by denying their representatives an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in the political process. 
Thus, single-member offices can cause a violation of section 2 that 
is unique to these offices, a violation that produces an inequality in 
both the opportunity to elect and the opportunity to participate in the 
political process. This unique type of violation thwarts section 2's goal 
of increasing civic inclusion in the political process by decreasing the 
effects of discrimination. Therefore, single-member offices should be 
open to challenge under section 2. Part IV develops guidelines for 
remedying violations of section 2 caused by single-member offices. 
IV. REMEDYING SECTION 2 VIOLATIONS CAUSED BY SINGLE-
MEMBER OFFICES 
This Part begins by outlining the powers of a federal court to rem-
edy violations of section 2. Although the defendant jurisdiction has 
the first opportunity to propose a cure, section IV.A demonstrates that 
the court retains broad remedial powers to ensure that a violation is 
completely cured. Section IV.B develops a two-step approach to rem-
edying violations caused by single-member offices. This approach rec-
ognizes that violations can be similar to those caused by multi-member 
offices or peculiar to single-member offices. Section IV.C tailors the 
remedies to different levels of government and different types of gov-
ernment offices. 
A. General Remedial Powers Under the Act 
Once a violation of section 2 is established, a district court must 
~fford the defendant jurisdiction the first opportunity to develop satis-
factory remedies. 214 This principle is constrained, however, by the 
Senate Report's admonition that a court addressing a section 2 viola-
tion "should exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion the 
relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority vot-
ing strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens 
to participate and to elect candidates of their choice."215 The Supreme 
soon as they reached the black community); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 
1971), affd. on rehg., 461F.2d1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (disparity in city services provided to blacks 
violates the fourteenth amendment). 
213. See Karlan, supra note 118, at 237-39. 
214. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41-43 (1982) (per curiam); McDaniel v. 
Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1981); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1978); Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964); Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1985); Ortiz, 
Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the Legislature to Police Itself, 4 J.L. & 
POL. 653 (1988). , . 
215. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208. 
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Court has noted that a district court has broad remedial powers when 
curing discrimination: 
A district court has "not merely the power but the duty to render a 
decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of 
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Once a right 
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable 
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are 
inherent in equitable remedies.216 
Thus, a court faced with a violation must ensure that any proposed 
remedy completely cures a violation.217 
B. A Two-Step Approach to Remedying Violations of the Act 
Caused by Single-Member Offices 
"The basic principle of equity that the remedy fashioned must be 
commensurate with the right that has been violated" establishes the 
guideline for curing a section 2 violation.218 To fulfill this require-
ment, one must recall how single-member offices violate section 2. A 
single-member office can violate the Act in two different ways. One 
type of violation, such as a discriminatory slating process or a majority 
vote runoff primary, is not peculiar to the nature of a single-member 
office.219 In Stallings and Dillard, by contrast, at-large elections com-
bined with concentrated power to cause a section 2 violation unique to 
single-member offices. Because single-member offices can violate the 
Act in two different ways, a variety of remedies are necessary. 
A court should take a two-step approach to curing violations of 
section 2 caused by single-member offices. First, a court should con-
sider remedies that enhance political participation without requiring a 
restructuring of government. These remedies would be implemented 
with traditional equitable devices such as injunctions and declaratory 
judgments. For example, a court might cure a discriminatory slating 
process for a single-member office by enjoining the process and order-
ing slating open to all interested parties. 220 Remedies under the first 
step would be particularly appropriate to cure misconduct by a single-
member officeholder that is an isolated violation rather than part of a 
216. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183-84 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Lou-
isiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1; 15 (1971)); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (embracing broad 
remedial powers for federal courts to cure constitutional violations involving discrimination, in-
cluding the power to order a school board to raise taxes to fund a desegregation plan). 
217. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208. A court "cannot authorize [a refuedy] that 
will not with certitude completely remedy the Section 2 violation." Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 
831 F.2d 246, 252 (11th Cir. 1987). 
218. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208. 
219. See supra notes 38 and 168-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of these devices. 
220. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (affirming the district court's grant 
of a declaratory judgment against discriminatory election practices and remanding for further 
consideration of remedies). 
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pattern of violations by the officeholder. If a mayor, for instance, re-
fused to distribute election materials to minority candidates, a court 
could enjoin the practice and order the mayor to distribute the materi-
als to any interested candidates. 221 
A second step would be necessary when the violation was peculiar 
to the powers of a single-member office and part of a pattern of viola-
tions that could not appropriately be cured by simply enjoining a prac-
tice. This remedy is a restructuring of the role of a single-member 
office in a government. Restructuring entails a parceling out of polit-
ical power to diminish the concentration of power in the single-mem-
ber office. For example, a single-member commission might be 
expanded to a multi-member commission as in Stallings. 222 In the al-
ternative, the court might order that the chair position of a commis-
sion be rotated among the commissioners, rather than be held by one 
individual as in Dillard. 223 Or a court might parcel out the power of a 
mayor's office by creating an additional office to share power, such as a 
vice-mayor, filled by councilmembers on a rotating basis.224 Once this 
remedial approach to single-member offices is established, one must 
determine which single-member posts in a state are open to challenge. 
C. Determining Which Single-Member Offices Are 
Open to Challenge 
The "share of" approach holds that any office that qualifies as sin-
gle-member is exempt from challenge.225 The Dillard court, with its 
emphasis on function, adopted a narrower definition of single-member 
offices than the "share of" approach. The Dillard court considers 
only nonlegislative functionaries to be single-member offices. 226 De-
spite the Dillard court's narrower approach to defining single-member 
offices, both it and the "share of" approach presume that some single-
member offices are exempt from challenge. 
This Note, in contrast, presumes that all single-member offices in a 
221. See, e.g., Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (The 
mayor intentionally discriminated against black candidates by withholding candidacy require-
ment information from them. The proper remedy was to enjoin the town to certify blacks as duly 
elected members of town co1;1ncil.). 
222. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1563 (11th Cir. 
1987), cert denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 
(1988); see also McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. III. 1987) (doubling size of 
city council), appeal dismissed, 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1987). 
223. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Warren v. 
-'city of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1054, 1059 (M.D. Fla. 1988), affd., 893 F.2d 347 (11th Cir. 
1989) (city agrees to allow any councilperson, not just those elected at-large, to serve as chairman 
and chairman pro-tem of the city council). 
224. See Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 683 F. Supp. 1545 (W.D. Tenn. 1988). 
225. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
226. Examples include tax collectors, sheriffs, and probate judges. 831 F.2d at 251. 
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state or political subdivision are open to challenge because these offices 
can thwart the goals of section 2. The Dillard court noted: 
Once a post is opened to the electorate, and if it is shown that the context 
of that election creates a discriminatory but corrigible election practice, 
it must be open in a way that allows racial groups to participate 
equally.221 
If a plaintiff challenges a particular single-member office, the plaintiff 
must, of course, show how it violates the Act. If the plaintiff meets 
this burden, the defendant cannot escape the challenge simply by 
claiming an exemption as· a single-member office. Instead, the defen-
dant must rebut the charged violation of the Act. This Note recog-
nizes, however, that different levels of government and different types 
of offices will vary in their susceptibility to successful challenge. Con-
sequently, this section examines how the remedial approach applies to 
different levels of government and types of offices. 
1. State Offices 
Congress designed section 2 to cover situations "where racial poli-
tics do dominate the political process."228 While single-member offices 
elected statewide, like a governor, certainly have the potential to en-
gage in a pattern of abuse peculiar to the power of these offices, dis-
criminatory actions by these officers are more likely to be isolated 
events. This may be explained by the decline in the negative effects of 
racial politics for statewide offices. 229 The recent election of Douglas 
Wilder as governor of Virginia suggests that race may be playing less 
of a role in statewide elections.230 In addition, evidence suggests that 
many Southern senators are becoming responsive to their black con-
227. 831 F.2d at 251. 
228. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 211. 
229. The negative effects of racial politics may be declining on the state level for two reasons. 
For one, progressive governors are attacking discrimination to enhance the image of their states 
and the productivity of their citizens. See Winbush, Mississippi ~ises Again, TIME, Nov. 16, 
1987, at 32 (noting the election of young progressive governors in both Louisiana and Missis-
sippi: Governor Mabus leads "an awakening movement to free Mississippi from its long-stand-
ing image of lethargy and backwardness"); Smothes, 3 Southern States Seek Progress Together. 
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1988, at AS, col. 1 (governors of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi 
meet to coordinate efforts to improve conditions in one of nation's poorest areas); Civil Rights 
Caravan to Mark Deaths, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18, col. 4 (Governor Mabus states: 
"Today, once more, the officials of Mississippi are standing in the schoolhouse door, but this time 
we are standing in that door to open it wider and to make sure that everybody gets in •••• "). 
Second, as minority groups begin to participate fully in the political systems, candidates realize 
they must court these potential voters. See, e.g., Barone, Civil Rights: An American Revolution, 
Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1987, at Al7, col. 1 (Mississippi has "just conducted a governor's race in 
which evidence of racism seems to have been entirely absent and in which every serious candi-
date has been striving to win blacks' vote."). 
230. Oreskes, First Black Governor If Recount Upholds Vote, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at 
Al, col. 1 (noting the success of Douglas Wilder). But cf. Oreskes, Joy of Democrats Diluted in 
Virginia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 2 (noting that Wilder received a lesser percentage 
of votes.than other successful candidates on his ticket, and concluding that racial considerations 
explain the difference). 
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stituents. For example, concern for their black constituencies moti-
vated Southern Democratic senators to vote against the nomination of 
Robert Bork.231 Anecdotal evidence similarly suggests that respon-
siveness by state officials to black voters is improving.232 Yet, single-
member state officeholders may still engage in electoral discrimina-
tion. For example, in Major v. Treen, 233 the governor of Louisiana, in 
concert with the state legislature, devised a racial gerrymander of the 
state's congressional districts.234 
Under this Note's approach to remedies, restructuring of the state 
single-member office in Major would not be the appropriate remedy. 
In fact, restructuring would probably rarely be appropriate at the state 
level when section 2 violations are singular events, rather than part of 
a pattern. In Major, other remedies were available to cure the electo-
ral discrimination. For instance, the Justice Department could have 
denied preclearance under section 5.235 And the court remedied the 
section 2 violation through declaratory judgment and injunction.236 
2. Offices in Political Subdivisions 
In contrast, if "racial politics do dominate the electoral process," 
the domination tends to occur more often at the city and county level 
than at the state.237 In addition, a district court is probably better 
231. Bork received the vote of only one of the 17 Democratic senators from the states of the 
old Confederacy. See Senate's Roll-Cal/ on the Bork Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1987, at 10, col. 
3; see also Dowd, Winning One from the Gipper, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 1987, at 125 (coalition of 
black, environmental, feminist, and labor groups key in Senate rejection of Bork nomination); 
Garment, The War Against Robert Bork, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1988, at 17 (arguing that Southern 
senators caved in to pressure from black interest groups). 
232. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 686 F. Supp. 1365, 1380 (E.D. Ark. 1988), 
ajfd., 902 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that Southern gubernatorial candidates have become 
more responsive to the interests of black voters); UPI, June 14, 1989 (available on Nexis, 
keyword Deathrow) (Governor Mabus, "at the urging of a powerful black leader, [] has agreed 
to conduct a clemency hearing for two-time convicted killer Leo Edwards."). 
233. 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983). 
234. 574 F. Supp. at 333-37. For example, the governor threatened to veto a reapportion-
ment plan (the Nunez Plan) that would facilitate the election of a black congressman. "Louisi-
ana's chief executive has considerable power and influence, both dejure and de facto. Testimony 
reflects that the Louisiana Legislature has never overridden a gubernatorial veto. A sufficient 
number of legislators changed their position in response to the threatened veto to assure the 
demise of the Nunez Plan." 574 F. Supp. at 333. 
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). The Justice Department precleared the plan sponsored by 
Governor Treen. For a criticism of the preclearance, see Guinier, supra note 124, at 408-11. 
236. 574 F. Supp. at 355-56. 
237. For example, a Westlaw search of 42 U.S.C. § 1973 cases decided in 1989-1990 revealed 
twice as many challenges to county or city practices than to state practices. One explanation for 
this is simply mathematical. A state contains numerous counties and political subdivisions, each 
with their own political processes. A state government, however, has a limited number of state-
wide political processes and a limited number of statewide offices. Thus, plaintiffs have greater 
opportunities to challenge practices by cities or counties than by states. 
Another explanation for the greater number of challenges to the political processes of cities 
and counties may be that pockets of racial politics persist in political subdivisions but do not taint 
an entire state. Possibly, Congress had this in mind when it focused on "some communities in 
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equipped to apply an " 'intensely local' " and functional appraisal to a 
city or county's political processes than to a state govemment's.238 
For these reasons, courts should be more receptive of challenges to 
city or county single-member offices than to state single-member posts. 
Consequently, the Note focuses greater attention on the city or county 
level of government than it did on state government. 
a. Legislative and legislative-executive offices. Consider single-
member offices in a legislative or legislative-executive body, such as a 
city council president or a chairperson of a county commission. Some 
violations caused by the selection methods for these offices or by the 
conduct of these officeholders could be cured with injunctions chang-
ing the method of selection or preventing particular conduct.239 But 
when at-large selection for these offices combines with the use of con-
centrated power by single-member officeholders and diminishes the in-
fluence of racial minorities, an injunction alone will not cure the 
violation. A court cannot simply order a change from at-large to dis-
trict elections for single-member posts because the offices being elected 
cannot be chosen directly by. districts. 240 Instead of a change in elec-
tion method, the court should change the distribution of powers of the 
single-member office. For example, a court could order the chairper-
son position on a county commission rotated among the commission 
members chosen by districts.241 In this way, the position is held by 
members elected by district, and all districts are represented. 
Similarly, a court should not simply enjoin these single-member 
offices from using their concentrated power to lessen minority influ-
ence, because this would require a constant monitoring of a local gov-
ernment. Instead, a court should deconcentrate the chairperson's 
power by rotating it among the commission members.242 In this way, 
our Nation where racial politics do dominate the electoral process." SE.NATE REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 211. 
238. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 
622 (1982)). The Court in Gingles also recognized that it must apply "a 'functional' view of 
political process mandated by § 2." 478 U.S. at 48 n.15. 
239. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
240. When at-large elections produce a violation of § 2, the typical remedy is to switch to 
election by districts. See supra note 190. This remedy is not possible, however, when only one 
office is to be elected. Consider the election of a chairperson of a county commission in a county 
divided into five election districts. One district of the five cannot be chosen to elect the chairper-
son because that would exclude the other four districts from any participation in the selection 
process. The county as a whole could be considered one district, but that would be an at-large 
election, a result to be avoided. 
241. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 298 (M.D. Ala. 1986), ajfd. in 
part and remanded in part, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987), reinstated on remand, 619 F. 
Supp. 1546, 1547 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Warren v. City of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1054 (M.D. 
Fla. 1988), affd., 893 F.2d 347 (11th Cir. 1989) (city agrees to allow any council person, not just 
those elected at large, to serve as chairman and chairman pro-tern of the city council). 
242. See supra note 241. 
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the minority group can begin to protect itself in the political process 
without further supervision by a court. 
b. Executive offices. If a plaintiff establishes that an executive sin-
gle-member office, such as a mayor, violates section 2, the cure may 
require a greater restructuring of government than the remedy for a 
chairperson. Isolated incidents of executive single-member offices vio-
lating the Act may be cured by the court with a traditional equitable 
remedy such as an injunction targeted at a specific incident. 243 When 
violations by an executive single-member office establish a pattern of 
consistent activity designed to diminish minority participation in the 
political process, a court might take one of two approaches to 
restructuring. 244 
One approach would be to diminish the power of the executive's 
office by parceling out power to another office. For example, a vice-
mayor's office might be created with some of the mayor's former 
power shifted to that office. This office might be filled by council 
members on a rotating basis. 245 A second approach would be to 
change a mayor-council form of government to a city commission with 
a rotating chairperson or a hired executive.246 
243. See, e.g., Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (The 
mayor intentionally discriminated against black candidates by withholding candidacy require-
ment information from them. The proper remedy was to enjoin the town to certify blacks as duly 
elected members of town council.); Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (The 
court granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the city's reapportionment plan drawn by 
the mayor to disadvantage his opponent. The plan resulted in a dilution of minority voting.). 
244. Election at large, combined with the use of concentrated power over time by an execu-
tive single-member office, produces a unique pattern of violations. This combination also pro-
duces violations unique to legislative and legislative-executive single-member offices. Under this 
Note's approach, single-member offices, depending on branch of government, require different 
levels of proof of concentrated power necessary to establish a § 2 violation. Legislative and legis-
lative-executive posts require a minimal showing on concentrated power. For example, a county 
chairperson elected at-large from a county with polarized voting, the presence of a number of the 
Senate factors, and a showing of concentrated power with the potential to diminish minority 
influence could violate § 2. Plaintiffs would not have to show that the concentrated power was 
actually used to diminish minority influence. In contrast, plaintiffs challenging an executive sin-
gle-member post would be required to show actual use of power by the officeholder to diminish 
minority influence. 
The difference in the required proof of concentrated pawer stems from the differences in the 
remedies available to replace at-large elections for these offices. At-large elections for legislative 
and legislative executive-offices could be modified in ways that interfere minimally with the struc-
tures of local governments. For instance, election at-large can be changed to the equivalent of 
election by district. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. In contrast, at-large election for 
executive single-member posts cannot be simply switched to district elections because the only 
possible district is the entire jurisdiction, the same as for at-large elections. Instead, to remedy a 
violation, power from the single-member post must be parceled out to other offices or the local 
government restructured. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. Because these reme-
dies intrude more into the structure of local government than do remedies for legislative single-
member posts, the threshold showing on concentrated power is higher for executive single-mem-
ber offices. 
245. See, e.g., Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 683 F. Supp. 1545 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (plan for 
restructuring the city government included the office of vice-mayor to be held by council mem-
bers and rotated among them). 
246. For the benefits produced by having a commission with a rotating chairperson or some 
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A critic might claim either of these two approaches clash with the 
need for a single executive, accountable citywide, with the interests of 
the entire city at heart. 247 This objection, however, ignores the polit-
ical realities of racial discrimination and racially polarized voting. 248 
Precisely because these ills exist, a white executive is often not ac-
countable to the entire city, nor does he have the interests of the entire 
town at heart; rather, he often protects only the interests of the major-
ity voters. 
Restructuring or parceling out power will actually increase city-
wide accountability by giving power to executives who represent ma-
jority and minority interests. A critic might counter that this will 
become a spoils system, with the majority executive favoring his con-
stituents during his term and the minority executive favoring his con-
stituency during his term. More likely, a checking system will result 
where neither executive is willing to favor his own constituents unduly 
because he knows that the other executive can undo some favors and 
reward his own constituents.249 Even if a spoils system developed, mi-
nority voters would at least begin to share in the spoils they have been 
denied. 
A critic might also argue that these approaches recognize race to 
the detriment of a colorblind society.250 The Senate Report, however, 
rejected this argument.251 Courts and commentators, drawing on this 
congressional intent, have also rejected arguments against the race 
consciousness of remedies.252 To achieve equal opportunities to elect 
other apportionment of power, see Karlan, supra note 118, at 241 n.276. For the benefits pro-
duced by a hired executive, see Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 251 n.12 (11th Cir. 
1987) (hired executive subject to greater control by the commission). 
247. See, e.g., United States v. Marengo County Commn., 643 F. Supp. 232, 234-35 (S.D. 
Ala. 1986), ajfd. sub nom Clark v. Marengo County, 811 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1987) (The county 
argued that it needed to retain an at-large chairperson for the County Commission and Board of 
Education because the chairperson must be able to represent the interests of the entire county.). 
248. See, e.g., Westwego Citizens for Better Govt. v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (rejecting the cost or administrative upheaval caused by restructuring as factors to 
consider in determining whether § 2 has been violated). 
249. See Karlan, supra note 118, at 241 n.276 for an example of how this checking function 
would work. 
250. See, e.g., Marengo County Commn., 643 F. Supp. at 232-33 (district judge expressing his 
concern that the remedy mandated by the Appeals Court hampers achievement of a colorblind 
society). 
251. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208-11. 
252. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984) noted: 
Congress necessarily took into account and rejected as unfounded, or assumed as out-
weighed, several risks to fundamental political values that opponents of the amendments 
urged in committee deliberations and floor debate. Among these were the risk that the 
judicial remedy might actually be at odds with the judgment of significant elements in the 
racial minority; the risk that creating "safe" black-majority single member districts would 
perpetuate racial ghettos and racial polarization in voting behavior; the risk that reliance 
upon the judicial remedy would supplant the normal, more healthy processes of acquiring 
political power by registration, voting and coalition building; and thefundamental risk that 
the recognition of "group voting rights" and the imposing of affirmative obligations upon gov-
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and to participate in the political process, race must be taken into 
account. 
Finally, a critic may argue that spreading power or restructuring 
implicates section 2's proviso against proportional representation be-
cause these remedies provide a minority group with a proportional 
share of a single-member office.253 Certainly, section 2 denies any 
"right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal 
to their proportion in the population."254 Thus, a lack of proportional 
representation does not trigger a section 2 violation. 255 A minority 
group does, however, have the right to an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect candidates of its choice.256 
When this right is violated, nothing in section 2 prohibits a court from 
employing proportional representation as a remedy.257 
emment to secure those rights by race-conscious electoral mechanisms was alien to the Ameri-
can political tradition. 
Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 356-57 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
See Blacksher, Drawing Single Member Districts to Comply with the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, 17 URB. LAW. 347 (1985). "Now Congress has squarely rejected the argu-
ment that a race-conscious Voting Rights Act would be bad public policy. The results of 
amended section 2 of the Act extends the consideration of race beyond mere avoidance of retro-
gression [(a § 5 requirement)] to full consideration of a plan's racial fairness." Id. at 352. 
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982); see, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 43, at 21. 
254. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982). Similarly, the Court has held that minority groups have no 
constitutional right to proportional representation. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 
78-79 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.); Bolden, 446 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concurring); 
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. I, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Whit-
comb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); see also Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims 
to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 
34 HAsTINGS L.J. 1, 51 n.320 (1982) (tracing and questioning the Court's resistance to a right of 
proportional representation). 
255. An inequality in the number of candidates elected by a minority group may, however, 
provide some evidence of vote dilution. See supra note 100 (factor 7); see also Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30; 74-75 (1986). While the election of a few minority officials does not bar a 
vote dilution claim, Gingles, 478 U.S. at 75, courts have held that persistent proportional repre-
sentation would preclude a finding of vote dilution. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77. 
Even persistent proportional representation should not preclude a minority group from argu-
ing that its elected representatives received an unequal opportunity to participate in the political 
process. Suppose that a minority group comprising 20 percent of a city consistently elected one 
offive city council members, but this representative was excluded from key deliberations between 
the mayor and the other council members. In that case, the minority group should be able to 
challenge the actions of the mayor and council because their actions deny the minority group's 
representatives an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. 
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982); see also Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 148 (2d 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986) ("Although the Act makes clear that a class has no 
right to elect its members by numerical proportion, the class does have a right to an opportunity, 
equal to that of other classes to obtain such representation.") (emphasis omitted). 
257. Senators East and Helms, during the debates on amending§ 2, proposed amendments 
to prevent federal courts from employing proportional representation as a remedy. Senator East 
proposed an amendment explicitly proscribing proportional representation as a remedy. 128 
CoNG. REc. 14137 (June 17, 1982). The Senate rejected the East amendment. Id. at 14140. 
Senator Helms then proposed an amendment specifically allowing courts to employ proportional 
representation. Id. Senator Helms voted against his amendment, explaining that by voting 
against the amendment Congress would prevent courts from using proportional representation. 
Id. at 14141-42. The Senate defeated the Helm's amendment, not because the Senate rejected 
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c. Nonlegislative functionaries. Objections to applying the Act to 
single-member offices are less likely to be raised in cases that require 
less restructuring of local government. For example, challenges to sin-
gle-member offices falling under the nonlegislative functionary head-
ing would be less likely than executive offices to require restructuring 
as a remedy. According to the Dillard court, examples of nonlegisla-
tive functionaries include tax collectors, sheriffs, and probate 
judges.2ss Nonlegislative functionaries would most likely violate the 
Act in ways not peculiar to single-member offices. For instance, a tax 
collector might be chosen by a slating process that diminishes minor-
ity influence in the process. Nonlegislative functionaries have few op-
portunities to diminish influence in ways unique to single-member 
offices. Consider an elected sheriff who makes a number of decisions 
that harm minority interests. The sheriff hires all white deputies, and 
he places fewer police patrols in black neighborhoods while enforcing 
the law more vigorously against accused black criminals. 
However, the sheriff would presumably be subject to the control of 
the executive and legislative branches of his county govemment.259 
This would enable minority officials and voters to influence the sheriff 
in ways other than direct election. And, while the sheriff's acts are 
discriminatory, the Voting Rights Act does not apply because the con-
duct does not interfere with opportunities to participate in the political 
process. Therefore, the appropriate remedies for the sheriff's conduct 
would be found in statutes like section 1983260 and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act261 rather than in the Voting, Rights Act. In general, 
restructuring will not be an appropriate remedy for nonlegislative 
functionaries because they rarely exercise power in ways peculiar to 
single-member offices. 
The office of probate judge may, however, challenge that guideline. 
proportional representation, but because the amendment was irrelevant since the Bill was not 
intended to interfere with the equitable remedies employed by federal courts. Id. at 14141 (state· 
ment of Sen. Edward Kennedy). For further discussion of the congressional activity on the issue 
of proportional representation, see Boyd & Markman, supra note 1, at 1392-404, 1418-19; How· 
ard & Howard, supra note 117, at 1624-26; McKenzie & Krauss, supra note 20, at 166-67; see 
also Additional Remarks of Senator Hatch, SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 270 ("The 'com· 
promise' provision also purports to establish an explicit prohibition upon subsection (a) giving 
rise to any right to proportional representation. This is not quite the case. Most pointedly, 
perhaps, there is nothing in the provision that addresses the issue of proportional representation 
as a remedy."). 
258. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 251 (11th Cir. 1987). 
259. See, e.g., In Re Application of Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 188 N.J. 
Super. 343, 457 A.2d 495, ajfd., 190 N.J. Super. 256, 463 A.2d 351 (1983) (per curiam), cert. 
granted. 94 N.J. 587, 468 A.2d 225 (1983), ajfd., 99 N.J. 90, 491 A.2d 631 (1985) (per curiam) 
(the legislature controls the duties of the sheriff and the activities of his office); Brownstown 
Township v. County of Wayne, 68 Mich. App. 244, 242 N.W.2d 538 (1976) (the legislature may 
vary the duties of a sheriff's office). 
260. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
261. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1982). 
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Probate judges often serve dual functions, wearing the hats of both 
judge and chairperson of a county commission. 262 When a probate 
judge acts as a chairperson, he may diminish influence in ways pecu-
liar to single-member offices.263 In that case, a court should consider 
removing the probate judge from the county commission or retaining 
the judge as a member of the commission but order the chairposition 
rotated. But suppose a probate judge is serving only as a judge and she 
is the sole probate judge in a jurisdiction. Could this judge, as a single-
member office, be open to challenge?264 Judgeships, like other elected 
positions, are open to challenge under section 2.265 Thus, if the juris-
diction chose the single judge with a discriminatory election method 
or by a process that otherwise diminished participation in the political 
process, a court could cure the violation with an injunction targeted at 
the specific practice. 
Rarely, however, would a judge diminish influence in a way pecu-
liar to single-member offices. Yet, a single judge might be challenged 
under the Stallings rationale. Suppose a single judge made all the judi-
cial decisions for a large county, like the 495 square-mile county in 
Stallings, while other counties of comparable size and caseloads had 
three or more judges assigned. A plaintiff might challenge this judicial 
assignment, arguing that the policy behind the assignment was tenu-
ous and possibly evidence of intentional discrimination.266 If a plain-
tiff satisfied the other prerequisites for a challenge, the appropriate 
remedy might be adding judges to the county and electing them by 
district. 
CONCLUSION 
Single-member offices can impede the goals of section 2 both in 
262. See, e.g., United States v. Dallas County Commn., 661 F. Supp. 955, 951 (S.D. Ala. 
1987) (noting that 33 of 67 counties in Alabama have probate judges who also chair the county 
commission). 
263. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dillard chairperson. 
264. The court in Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 519-
20 & n.25 (M.D. Ala. 1989), draws on the plaintiff's failure to challenge districts and circuits 
with only one judge as a recognition that these offices are single-member and not open to 
challenge. 
265. See Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988); Martin v. Mabus, 700 
F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988). 
266. The Senate Report recognizes a tenuous policy as evidence indicating an unequal oppor-
tunity to elect a candidate of the minority group's choice and to participate in the political pro-
cess. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 207. The Report notes that "[i]f the procedure 
markedly departs from past practices or from practices elsewhere in the jurisdiction, that bears 
on the fairness of its impact." Id. at n.117. In City of Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 
829 F.2d 1547, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton 
Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988), the court found that the legislature switched from a 
five-member commission to a single-member commission for Carroll County to discriminate in-
tentionally against black citizens by preventing them from electing a commissioner. 
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ways similar to multi-member offices and in ways unique to single-
member offices. Therefore, single-member posts should be subject to 
challenge under section 2, rather than immune from challenge as sug-
gested by some courts. 
A traditional understanding of electoral discrimination - with its 
focus on disenfranchisement, candidate diminution, and vote dilution 
- explains how a single-member office can violate section 2 in ways 
similar to a multi-member office. This traditional understanding also 
teaches that these violations by single-member offices should be cured 
with remedies similar to those used for violations by multi-member 
offices. 
This traditional understanding of electoral discrimination, how-
ever, fails to identify how single-member offices can violate the Act in 
unique ways. At-large elections for single-member offices can place 
these offices beyond reach of minority voters. The power concentrated 
in single-member offices can diminish the opportunity of minority citi-
zens and their elected officials to participate in the political process. 
Thus, these characteristics of single-member posts combine to create 
an inequality in both the opportunity to elect and the opportunity to 
participate. To remedy these unique violations, courts should consider 
restructuring single-member offices to decrease their concentrated 
power. 
Minority citizens have increased their participation in the political 
process, but obstacles to full participation remain. Subjecting single-
member offices to challenge breaks down a remaining barrier to full 
participation in the political process. 
- Edward J. Sebold 
